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TAXATION SURVEY
JAMES SERVEN*
In contrast to the diversified and significant nature of the federal tax
cases that came before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 199 1,1 the
court labored through a rather bland and uneventful 1992. While 1992
presented the court with an opportunity to clarify some matters of inter-
est, for the most part the year passed without any major developments.
Perhaps as a result of a recessionary economy, or a growing discontent
among the taxpaying public, an increasing percentage of the court's
time in the tax area seems dedicated to disposing of matters related in
one fashion or another to the enforcement of the federal tax laws and
the resolution of procedural or administrative disputes between taxpay-
ers and the government, rather than to the interpretation of more sub-
stantive tax issues. As more and more citizens encounter difficulties in
meeting the tax obligations imposed upon them in a soft economy, the
court's opinions increasingly center on challenges - sometimes suc-
cessful, more often not - to the propriety of the assessment, collection,
foreclosure, levy and seizure activities of the Internal Revenue Service.
Taxpayers appear more aggressive in attempting to hide their assets,
hence an increase in fraudulent conveyance determinations. Tax protes-
tors regularly bring specious constitutional or similar arguments to the
court, ultimately claiming that no living human being is subject to fed-
eral taxation. These arguments are just as regularly dismissed by the
court, occasionally with the imposition of sanctions. Tax issues im-
pacting the distribution of bankruptcy estates occur with more fre-
quency. While the Tenth Circuit addressed many matters meeting these
descriptions, virtually no opinion of substantive importance evolved
from the court's activities in 1992.
This Survey first examines in detail some of the more noteworthy
federal tax cases - noteworthy at least on a relative basis - disposed of
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1992.2 This Survey then con-
cludes by summarizing other opinions handed down by the court in the
tax area during the year just past.
* B.S.B.A., Accounting, University of Denver, 1977; Masters in Taxation, Univer-
sity of Denver, 1978; J.D., Stanford University 1981; Lecturer in Law, University of
Denver.
1. See James Serven, Eighteenth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Taxation, 69 DENV. U. L.
REv. 1037 (1992).
2. This Survey examines opinions handed down or otherwise first made available by
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1992, in the area of federal income, estate, and gift
taxation.
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I. TIMELY MAILED NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY IS VALID IF RECEIVED
TAXPAYER IN MANNER NOT WORKING PREJUDICIAL DELAY,
EVEN THOUGH IMPROPERLY ADDRESSED: SCHEIDT
V. COMMISSIONER 3
A. Background
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue must make an assessment of taxes, if at all, within three
years after a taxpayer files a return.4 If the Commissioner determines
that there is a deficiency 5 in respect of any tax, the Commissioner is
authorized to send a statutory Notice of Deficiency to the taxpayer by
certified or registered mail,6 informing the taxpayer of the deficiency
proposed to be assessed by the Commissioner. The mailing of the No-
tice of Deficiency is a prerequisite to the making of the assessment.
7
The taxpayer to whom the Notice of Deficiency is sent may then file a
petition with the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of the
deficiency set forth in the Notice.8 Such a petition must be filed within
ninety days after the date of mailing of the Notice of Deficiency. 9 Dur-
ing this ninety day period, the Commissioner is precluded from entering
an assessment against the taxpayer in respect of the deficiency proposed
in the Notice of Deficiency. 10 However, if the taxpayer fails to timely file
a petition for redetermination with the Tax Court within the ninety day
statutory period, the Commissioner is directed to assess the deficiency
following the expiration of the ninety days. I I The Commissioner may
thereupon commence collection activities against the taxpayer and his
assets.
3. 967 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 811 (1992).
4. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1988). Under certain circumstances, the three-year statute of
limitations is extended. For example, if the return omits items of gross income that exceed
twenty-five percent of the amount of gross income otherwise reflected in the return, the
statutory limitations period is increased to six years. Id § 6501(e)(1). In addition, the
statute of limitations is completely open-ended where there has been a false or fraudulent
return with the intent to evade tax, where there has been a willful attempt to defeat or
evade tax, or where no return has been filed. Id. § 6501(c).
5. A "deficiency" is defined in the context of income tax by I.R.C. § 6211 (a) to mean,
"(1) the excess of the statutorily imposed tax over the total of the amount shown on the
taxpayer's return, (2) plus previous assessments, (3) less abatements, credits, refunds, or
other prepayments." Keado v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1209, 1210 n.l (5th Cir. 1988).
6. I.R.C. § 6212(a) (1988).
7. Id. § 6213(a).
8. Id. The Tax Court is the only forum available for the litigation of tax cases which
does not require the prepayment of the deficiency. "If the taxpayer fails to timely file a
Tax Court petition, but still desires to contest the merits of the deficiency, he must pay the
deficiency in full and sue for a refund in a United States District Court or the United States
Claims Court." Keado, 853 F.2d at 1212, n.10. The Notice of Deficiency, also known as
the "90 day letter," has been described as the taxpayer's "ticket to the Tax Court." Del-
man v. Commissioner, 384 F.2d 929, 934 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 952 (1968).
9. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
10. Id. If the taxpayer does file a timely petition with the Tax Court, the Commis-
sioner is further precluded from assessing the deficiency "until the decision of the Tax
Court becomes final." Id.
11. Id § 6213(c). An " 'assessment,' essentially a bookkeeping notation, is made
when the Secretary or his delegate establishes an account against the taxpayer on the tax
rolls." Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 170 n.13 (1976).
[Vol. 70:4
TAXATION
The running of the three-year statute of limitations is tolled during
the time that the Commissioner is precluded from assessing a deficiency
- that is, for the ninety days following the mailing of the Notice of Defi-
ciency - and for sixty days thereafter. 12 Whether or not a Notice of
Deficiency has been validly delivered to the taxpayer so as to be suffi-
cient to toll the statute of limitations can be a question of crucial impor-
tance to the Commissioner, particularly where the Notice is sent just
prior to the expiration of the three-year period. In the case of an in-
come tax deficiency, the Internal Revenue Code provides the Commis-
sioner with a safe harbor which states that a Notice of Deficiency will be
deemed sufficient if it is mailed by certified or registered mail to the
taxpayer at his "last known address."' 3 Thus, if the Commissioner
mails the Notice by certified or registered mail to the taxpayer's last
known address,' 4 the Notice will operate to suspend the statute of limi-
tations as to the taxpayer, despite the fact that the taxpayer may never
receive the Notice and may therefore be unaware of the proposed as-
sessment.' 5 Such a Notice provides a form of deemed notification to the
taxpayer.
If the Notice of Deficiency is not sent to the taxpayer's last known
address, the safe harbor will not operate to toll the statute of limitations.
However, it may happen that the taxpayer, in fact, ultimately receives
the Notice, even though it was improperly addressed, such as where the
Notice is simply forwarded through the mails to the taxpayer's current,
correct address. In such circumstances, the safe harbor will be unavaila-
ble to the Commissioner. The courts have generally held, however, that
when the Commissioner has been successful in providing the taxpayer
with actual notice of the proposed assessment, even though the Notice,
although timely mailed, was not sent to the taxpayer's last known ad-
dress, the Notice is sufficient to suspend the statute of limitations as of
the date of mailing if there has been no delay in the taxpayer's receipt of
the Notice that would prejudice the taxpayer's ability to timely file his
petition with the Tax Court.' 6
12. I.R.C. § 6503(a)(1). The statute of limitations is further tolled during the pen-
dency of court proceedings, if a Tax Court petition is timely filed. Id.
13. Id. § 6212(b)(1).
14. The Internal Revenue Service is required to use "reasonable diligence" to ascer-
tain the taxpayer's correct address. Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 662, 664
(10th Cir. 1985). See also Gullen v. Barnes, 819 F.2d 975, 977 (10th Cir. 1987).
15. In a 1992 decision that was not officially reported, the court of appeals upheld a
determination by the district court that a Notice of Deficiency had been timely mailed to
the taxpayer's last known address, and thus, the district court had no jurisdiction to hear
the taxpayer's action to enjoin the Service from imposing liens and levies against his prop-
erty. Howell v. United States, No. 92-3016, 1992 U. S. App. LEXIS 32709 (10th Cir. Dec.
11, 1992).
16. See, e.g., Borgman v. Commissioner, 888 F.2d 916, 918 (1st Cir. 1989) (Notice of
Deficiency was mailed to the taxpayer in Chicago, then immediately forwarded to him at
correct address in Acton, Massachusetts, so as to be received five days after mailing and
two days prior to the date the statute of limitations would run. The court stated that: "[a]
notice of deficiency that is actually received without delay prejudicial to the taxpayer's
ability to petition the Tax Court is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as of the date
of mailing."); McKay v. Commissioner, 886 F.2d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[Ihf mailing
results in actual notice without prejudicial delay... it meets the conditions of § 6212(a) no
1993]
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B. Facts
William and Wanda Scheidt filed their 1978 federal income tax re-
turn on June 15, 1979. On June 9, 1982, six days before the expiration
of the three-year statutory limitation period, the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue mailed a Notice of Deficiency to the Scheidts, proposing a
deficiency with respect to their 1978 return. 17 The Notice was sent by
certified mail, addressed to the Scheidts at Post Office Box 20711,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. At that time, however, Box 20711 was not
the correct mailing address for the Scheidts. Sometime during 1981, the
Scheidts had relinquished Box 20711, and had begun renting Box
20748. Both boxes were located at the Village Branch of the Post Of-
fice. On December 31, 1981, the forwarding order from Box 20711 to
Box 20748 expired.
On May 19, 1981, the Scheidts had informed the Internal Revenue
Service' 8 that all notices and other correspondence from the Service to
the Scheidts should be sent to their home address.' 9 Pursuant to a
Power of Attorney granted on Form 2848 to their accountant, Robert J.
Drewell, and filed with the Commissioner, the Scheidts also directed the
Commissioner to send copies of all such correspondence to Mr.
Drewell. 20 The Commissioner did not send duplicate originals of the
Notice of Deficiency to the Scheidts home address, to Box 20748, or to
Mr. Drewell.
On or aboutJune 10, 1982, the Village Branch Post Office received
the Notice of Deficiency. Although a notice was placed in Box 20711
informing the Scheidts of the certified letter, it was not picked up. Sub-
sequently, on July 6, 1982, the letter was placed in Box 20748. William
Scheidt then picked up the letter and signed for it on that date.2 1 Mea-
sured from July 6, 1982, the Scheidts, therefore, did not receive the No-
matter to what address the notice successfully was sent.") (quoting Clodfelter v. Commis-
sioner, 527 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 979 (1976)). See also Lakota
v. Commissioner, No. 90-1796, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 2833 (1st Cir. Feb. 15, 1991) (mis-
addressed Notice mailed on February 21, 1989, was actually received by taxpayer some-
time in March, well before the May 22 date by which his Tax Court petition would need to
be filed; held, the Notice was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations); Pugsley v. Com-
missioner, 749 F.2d 691 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (taxpayer not prejudiced when a Notice of Defi-
ciency misaddressed to Tampa, Florida, was immediately forwarded to taxpayer's correct
address in St. Mary, Georgia). For an extreme case, see Boccutto v. Commissioner, 277
F.2d 549 (3rd Cir. 1960) (Notice mailed on November 13, 1959, and returned undelivered
is nevertheless sufficient when personally handed to the taxpayer at Internal Revenue Ser-
vice office on January 21, 1960). Cf Sicker v. Commissioner, 815 F.2d 1400 (11 th Cir.
1987) (misaddressed notice of deficiency not sufficient to toll statute of limitations where
notice not received by taxpayer until eighty-seven days after its mailing and eight days
prior to expiration of ninety-day period for filing petition with Tax Court).
17. The Notice also proposed a deficiency arising out of the Scheidts' 1979 federal
income tax return.
18. The Internal Revenue Service is sometimes referred to herein as the "Service."
19. Scheidt v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1501 (1985).
20. Id. Mr. Drewell began renting Box 20711 after it was relinquished by the
Scheidts. Mr. Scheidt and Mr. Drewell had "office shared" since May of 1981. Id.
21. The record is unclear as to how the letter found its way to Box 20748. Presuma-
bly, personnel at the. Village Branch Post Office were aware of the Scheidts' new box and
simply placed the letter there.
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tice of Deficiency until twenty-one days after the expiration of the three-
year statute of limitations, twenty-seven days after the mailing of the No-
tice, and sixty-three days prior to the date that the Scheidts would be
required to file a timely petition with the Tax Court to contest the pro-
posed assessment, assuming the Notice was valid.
On September 4, 1992, the Scheidts timely filed a petition with the
Tax Court with respect to the 1978 deficiency. The Scheidts then filed
a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and a motion for
summary judgment, on the theory that the Notice of Deficiency was not
timely mailed to them and that the Notice, therefore, did not toll the
three-year statute of limitations. If the statute of limitations had not
been tolled, the Notice must then be considered untimely, and there
could be no valid assessment of the proposed deficiency relating to
1978.
C. Result in the Tax Court
In a 1985 memorandum opinion,2 2 the Tax Court denied both mo-
tions filed by the Scheidts, holding that, although the Notice of Defi-
ciency had not been mailed to the Scheidts' last known address and the
constructive notice safe harbor did not apply, nevertheless, the Scheidts
did in fact receive the Notice in time to file a timely petition with the Tax
Court. Thus, because the Notice had been timely mailed by the Service
and received by the Scheidts with ample time to file their Tax Court
petition, the Scheidts were not prejudiced by the delay. Therefore, the
Notice served to toll the three-year statute of limitations.
D. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax
Court.23 Citing cases decided in the other circuits, 24 the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals noted the established rule that where the taxpayer re-
ceives actual notice of a proposed assessment in the form of a Notice of
Deficiency that was timely mailed prior to the expiration of the three-
year statute of limitations to an address other than the taxpayer's last
known address, the Notice will nevertheless operate to toll the statute of
limitations if there has been no delay prejudicial to the taxpayer result-
ing from the fact that the Notice was not sent to his last known address.
Here, the court felt - and the taxpayers had in fact stipulated 2 5 - that
the Scheidts were not prejudiced by having sixty-three days to prepare
and file their Tax Court petition prior to the expiration of the ninety day
statutory period.
On appeal, the Scheidts attempted to convince the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals that a Notice of Deficiency is not sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations unless: (1) the Notice is mailed prior to the expira-
22. Scheidt v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1501 (1985).
23. The three-judge panel consisted ofJudge Moore, Judge Engle, and Judge Tacha.
24. See supra note 16 for the cited cases and additional cases.
25. Scheidt, 967 F.2d. at 1451, n.5.
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tion of the three-year statute of limitations, and (2) the Notice is received
by the taxpayer in "the due course of the mail."' 26 The Scheidts fash-
ioned their two-part test in reliance upon language appearing in prior
cases that apparently relied in part upon the fact that the misaddressed
letter was delivered in "due course."' 2 7 The Scheidts argued that be-
cause the Notice was not received by them until twenty-seven days after
its mailing, it was not received in the due course of the mail. The Tenth
Circuit was not persuaded, noting that the statute only requires the No-
tice of Deficiency to be mailed in a timely fashion, and does not explicitly
tie the effectiveness of the Notice to its receipt by the taxpayer. The court
thus declined to accept the Scheidts' invitation to "graft an additional
prerequisite to the tolling of the limitations period based on whether a
taxpayer receives the notice of deficiency in the due course of the
mails."
28
The Scheidts also argued that a constructive "remailing" of the No-
tice of Deficiency had occurred through the act of the Notice having
been voluntarily placed in the Scheidts' new Post Office box by the Pos-
tal Service. If that theory were correct, the date of mailing of the Notice
could no longer be considered as June 9, 1982, and would have to be
considered as the date the Notice was placed in the new Post Office box.
That later date fell outside the three-year statute of limitations. Accord-
ing to the Scheidts, such a "remailing" was, therefore, not timely, and
did not operate to toll the statute of limitations. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals was not impressed by the Scheidts' argument of "con-
structive remailing" and simply noted that, in fact, the Commissioner
had mailed the Notice only once.
29
26. Id. at 1451.
27. In the Tax Court, the Scheidts had relied on language in Frieling v. Commis-
sioner, 81 T.C. 42 (1983), to the effect that -[t]he notice [at issue in that case] complied
with section 6212(a) because petitioners received it in due course through the Postal Service
and filed a timely petition in this Court." Id. at 60-61 (emphasis added). The Scheidts also
relied upon Sicker v. Commissioner, 815 F.2d 1400 (11 th Cir. 1987), discussed supra note
16, as support for their two-part test. See also Zikria v. Williams, 535 F. Supp. 481, 485
(W.D. Pa. 1982) ("[W]here the notice is sent to the wrong address but delivered to the taxpayer
in due course, there is no prejudice to the taxpayer and the notice is valid.") (emphasis in
original).
28. Scheidt, 967 F.2d at 1451. The Tax Court, in response to the Scheidts' reliance on
Frieling, had stated that it did not read the Frieling opinion "as requiring a two-step test to
be met." Scheidt v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1501, 1504 (1985). The Tax Court
concluded that Frieling stands only for the proposition that "petitioners must not be
prejudiced by the misaddressing, and must be able to timely file a petition with the Tax
Court." Id. "The significant factor in the Frieling case, as in the instant case, is that peti-
tioners eventually received the notice and were afforded ample opportunity to file a peti-
tion." Id. at 1504-05. In response to the Scheidts' reliance upon the Sicker case, supra note
16, the Tenth Circuit found it easy to distinguish that case (where the taxpayers were
afforded only eight days to prepare their Tax Court petition) with the instant case (where
the Scheidts had sixty-three days to file such a petition). Scheidt, 967 F.2d at 1451.
29. The Tax Court opinion noted that "[d]uring the period from June 25, 1982, to
July 6, 1982, it is unclear what happened to the certified letter." Scheidt, 49 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 1503. The Scheidts had attempted to fill this gap by contending that the letter was in
fact returned to the Commissioner, who simply deposited it back in the mail. As to this
"proposed scenario," the Tax Court noted that the taxpayers had the burden of proof, but




The crux of the Scheidts' complaint centers around the fact that
employees of the Village Branch of the Postal Office apparently took it
upon themselves to locate the Scheidts' correct Post Office box and
placed the misaddressed Notice of Deficiency in it, rather than return
the Notice to the Commissioner. It would have been true that, had the
Postal Service returned the certified letter to the Commissioner follow-
ing the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations,3 0 and had the
Commissioner then remailed it to the proper address, the Notice would
by that time have been untimely and the statute of limitations for the
1978 tax year would have passed in the Scheidts' favor. The Scheidts
thus felt aggrieved that they were placed in a worse position than tax-
payers who are mailed misaddressed Notices of Deficiency that are re-
turned to the Commissioner after the limitations period has passed.
While conceding that such a distinction among taxpayers does exist, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the distinction was "rea-
sonable," 3' 1 noting that:
Given Congress' decision that the date of mailing tolls the limi-
tations period, a clearly rational distinction exists between
those taxpayers that receive a notice mailed before the three-
year period expires and those who do not.
3 2
The opinion of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Scheidt shows
the court to be in accord with the views espoused in other circuits, as
well as existing precedent in the Tenth Circuit. Where a taxpayer is not
prejudiced by a delay in receiving a Notice of Deficiency that has been
timely mailed by the Commissioner, the Notice will operate to toll the
applicable statute of limitations, despite the fact that the Notice was mis-
addressed, and regardless of the manner in which the Notice ultimately
finds its way into the hands of the taxpayer.33
30. The taxpayers argued that the Postal Service, pursuant to Postal Service regula-
tions, should have sent the Notice of Deficiency back to the Commissioner rather than
place it in their new box. Normally, the Post Office leaves three notices for the patron, and
if the letter remains unclaimed after fifteen days, the letter is returned to the sender.
Scheidt, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1503.
31. Scheidt, 967 F.2d at 1452.
32. Id.
33. The Scheidts fared appreciably better in 1992 with the malpractice action they
brought against the tax attorney who represented them in connection with their participa-
tion in the ill-fated International Monetary Exchange tax shelter litigation. See Scheidt v.
Klein, 956 F.2d 963 (10th. Cir. 1992).
1993]
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II. TENTH CIRCUIT CLARIFIES RELIEF AVAILABLE IN QUIET TITLE
ACTIONS AND ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIONS UNDER STATUTORY
EXCEPTION TO ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT: GUTHRIE V.




The statutory provisions of the Internal Revenue Code governing
the manner in which a taxpayer is informed of the existence of a pro-
posed assessment against him have been summarized above.3 6 The
main purposes of a Notice of Deficiency are to apprise the taxpayer of
the proposed assessment, and to provide the taxpayer with the opportu-
nity to file a petition with the Tax Court to obtain a redetermination of
the deficiency giving rise to the assessment. Such a petition must be
filed within ninety days of the date of mailing of the Notice of Defi-
ciency.3 7 If the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Tax Court, the
Internal Revenue Service may immediately assess the deficiency against
that taxpayer upon the expiration of the ninety day statutory period.
3 8
On the date of assessment, a general tax lien arises in favor of the
United States, against all the real and personal property of the
taxpayer.
3 9
The Internal Revenue Code requires that the Commissioner must
provide the taxpayer with a Notice of Assessment and Demand for Pay-
ment within sixty days after entering an assessment against the tax-
payer. 40 The notice and demand states the amount of the assessment,
and makes demand upon the taxpayer for payment. If the deficiency is
not paid, the Internal Revenue Service may pursue collection activities
against the taxpayer, including asserting the government's rights under
its general tax lien, described above. The government is also authorized
to levy upon and seize the taxpayer's property to recover the assess-
ment, after mailing a notice of intent to levy to the taxpayer.
41
Taxpayers often find themselves in the position of desiring to chal-
lenge the collection activities of the Internal Revenue Service, although
the ninety-day period for filing a petition with the Tax Court may osten-
sibly have already passed. Among other grounds, the taxpayer may
claim (1) that the assessment and collection were invalid because the
Notice of Deficiency was defective or never sent; (2) that the tax assess-
34. 970 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1992).
35. 970 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1992).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 4-16.
37. See supra text accompanying note 9.
38. See supra text accompanying note 11.
39. I.R.C. § 6321 (1988).
40. Id. § 6303(a).
41. Id. § 6331, which authorizes the Service to "levy upon all property and rights to
property... belonging to such person .... " including salaries and wages. The notice of
intent to levy must be provided by the Service thirty days prior to levy. Id. § 6331(d)(2).
Strict compliance with the statutory requirement that a notice of intent to levy be sent to
the taxpayer is a prerequisite to the validity of a levy. See United States v. Potemkin, 841
F.2d 97, 101-02 (4th Cir. 1988).
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ment was never entered or was otherwise procedurally infirm; (3) that
the Service never mailed the Notice of Assessment and Demand for Pay-
ment to the taxpayer, or there were other defects in the notification pro-
cess regarding the assessment; (4) that there were defects or
irregularities in- the tax lien or the Service's procedures in enforcing the
lien; or (5) that the Service never mailed a notice of intention to levy or
there were other procedural defects in the levy process. To be able to
obtain a forum for litigating such claims, the taxpayer must bring suit
under a statute that waives the sovereign immunity of the United
States.4 2 Generally speaking, the Anti-Injunction Act 4 3 prohibits suits
restraining the assessment or collection of federal taxes.
44
In the tax area, there are two major exceptions to the general bar of
the Anti-Injunction Act. First, the Anti-Injunction Act itself specifically
recognizes that suits may be brought under I.R.C. § 6213(a), which au-
thorizes an injunction prohibiting an assessment or levy when the tax-
payer has not received a notice of deficiency. 4 5 Second, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2410 authorizes civil actions against the United States to, inter alia,
"quiet title to . . . real or personal property on which the United States
has or claims a mortgage or other lien."
'4 6
Beyond this, there remains some uncertainty as to the nature and
scope of the challenges that may be mounted by a taxpayer bringing an
action pursuant to these two statutes, and as to the relationship between
them. For example, in a quiet title action under section 2410, may a
taxpayer challenge the sufficiency of the Notice of Deficiency? The
courts are in disagreement. In Elias v. Connett,4 7 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals determined that it did not have jurisdiction under section
2410 to consider the taxpayer's claim that the Commissioner's Notice of
Deficiency was defective, as that claim went to "the merits of [the tax-
payer's] assessment rather than the procedural validity of the lien."
4 8
On the other hand, the Third Circuit in Robinson v. United States4 9 al-
lowed the lack of a Notice of Deficiency to be challenged in a quiet title
42. See generally United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
43. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1988). With certain exceptions, this Act provides that "no suit
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained
in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such
tax was assessed." Id.
44. In addition, the Declaratory Judgment Act specifically prohibits declaratory judg-
ments in matters relating to federal taxes. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988).
45. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1988) provides, in part, that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions
of section 7 421(a), the making of [an assessment of a deficiency] or the beginning of [a
levy or proceeding in court for the collection of a deficiency] during the time such prohibi-
tion is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court."
46. See I.R.C. § 6212(c)(1) (1988) for the other statutory exception to the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act. In addition, if the evidence shows that the government could not ultimately pre-
vail and if equity jurisdiction otherwise exists because of extraordinary circumstances,
injunctive relief may be available to protect a taxpayer from collection activities. See
Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). See also Overton v.
United States, 925 F.2d. 1282, 1284 (10th Cir. 1991); Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d
1440, 1442 (10th Cir. 1990).
47. 908 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1990).
48. Id. at 527.
49. 920 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1990).
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action, apparently concluding that the taxpayer had no other forum in
which to raise the issue, and thus a failure to extend jurisdiction would
block the taxpayer's access to the courts and "impugn the procedural
validity of the assessment. "50
The Robinson opinion indicated that a taxpayer may be required to
show the lack of a remedy at law to invoke the statutory exceptions to
sovereign immunity, and that injunctive relief will be unavailable if the
taxpayer has such a remedy. The Robinson court noted that an adequate
remedy at law may be provided by the taxpayer's right to pay the defi-
ciency and sue for a refund.5 1 Must the taxpayer show the lack of a
remedy in order to invoke the statutory exception from the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act found in section 6213(a)? The weight of authority answers this
question in the affirmative.
52
The Tenth Circuit's views on these issues are not fully developed.
In Schmidt v. King,5 3 the court considered the scope of relief available to
a taxpayer in a section 2410 quiet title actin. In Schmidt, the court af-
firmed that "[w]hen the taxpayer challenges the procedural regularity of
the tax lien and the procedures used to enforce the lien," sovereign im-
munity is waived under section 2410. 54 On the other hand, the court
concluded that, contrary to the Robinson case, 55 challenges to a Notice
of Deficiency may not be brought in a section 2410 action, as section
2410 is "not to be construed as permitting a collateral attack on the
merits of a tax assessment."' 56 Finally, as to whether the taxpayer may
claim that the tax assessment is procedurally infirm, the court answered
in the negative, stating that "[ls]ection 2410 does not extend to chal-
lenges for procedural irregularities in assessment or collection of taxes"
where the validity of a tax lien is not at issue. 57 The Guthrie v. Sawyer 5
8
and James v. United States5 9 cases provided the Tenth Circuit with an op-
portunity to reconsider these views.
50. Id. at 1161.
51. Id. at 1160. See supra note 8.
52. See Lovell v. United States, 795 F.2d 976, 977 (11th Cir. 1986); Flynn v. United
States, 786 F.2d 586, 591 (3d Cir. 1986); Perlowin v. Sassi, 711 F.2d 910, 912 (9th Cir.
1983); Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1982); Philadelphia & Read-
ing Corp. v. Beck, 676 F.2d 1159, 1163 (7th Cir. 1982).
53. 913 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1990).
54. Id. at 839 (emphasis added). See also Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531 (9th
Cir. 1992); Stoecklin v. United States, 943 F.2d 42, 43 (11 th Cir. 1991); Arford v. United
States, 934 F.2d 229, 232 (9th Cir. 1991); McCarty v. United States, 929 F.2d 1085 (5th
Cir. 1991); Kulawy v. United States, 917 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir. 1990).
55. 920 F.2d 1159 (3d Cir. 1990). See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
56. Schmidt, 913 F.2d at 839. See also Pollack v. United States, 819 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.
1987); Egbert v. United States, 752 F. Supp 1010, 1014 (D. Wyo.), af'd, 940 F.2d 1539
(10th Cir. 1990).
57. Schmidt, 913 F.2d at 839.
58. 970 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1992).
59. 970 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1992).
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B. Guthrie v. Sawyer 60
1. Facts
James and Beatrice Guthrie and Wayne and Dorothy Wells had
been issued Notices of Deficiency to which they had not responded. Fol-
lowing the expiration of the ninety-day statutory period, the Internal
Revenue Service assessed deficiencies against them, and in the context
of the Service's collection activities, asserted tax liens against certain
property they owned. As to the Wellses, levy and seizure activities were
commenced. The taxpayers brought quiet title actions under section
2410 and actions seeking injunctions under section 6213(a), in the
course of which they challenged various aspects of the government's ac-
tions in assessing the tax and pursuing collection. The cases were ulti-
mately consolidated. While some of the taxpayers' claims were clearly
without merit, 6 ' nevertheless, it was incumbent upon the court to deter-
mine whether the court had jurisdiction over the claims under the two
statutes.
2. Results in the District Court
The Guthries had first claimed that they had not been mailed a No-
tice of Deficiency. Contrary to this claim, however, the record indicated
that on March 12, 1986, the Commissioner had mailed a Notice of Defi-
ciency by certified mail to James Guthrie, addressed to a Post Office box
in Jennings, Oklahoma. Although the Guthries alleged that the Internal
Revenue Service had not followed its own procedures in ascertaining
their "last known address," 62 it was essentially uncontroverted that this
Post Office box was in fact the Guthries' last known address. After no-
tices left in the Post Office box were ignored, the Notice was returned to
the Internal Revenue Service, marked "unclaimed," on March 29, 1986.
In a decision not officially reported, 63 the district court ruled that
the section 6213 exception to the Anti-Injunction Act waives sovereign
immunity as to this claim. The district court then held on the evidence
that a Notice of Deficiency had in fact been sent to the Guthries at their
last known address. 64 Thus, the Notice was sufficient to toll the applica-
ble statute of limitations, and the government's assessment was timely.
The Guthries also contended that the tax liens asserted by the govern-
60. 970 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1992).
61. The taxpayers were apparently "tax protestors." For example, in the district
court proceedings, Guthrie raised various constitutional arguments, such as that the as-
sessment was invalid because the federal income tax is a constitutionally proscribed direct
tax on income without apportionment, and that Guthrie was not a "person" required to
pay income taxes. The district court properly rejected these specious arguments. See
Guthrie v. Sawyer, 89-1 U.S. Tax Gas. (CCH) 9139, at 87,134 (N.D. Okla. 1989). Such
"tired arguments are the repertory of the tax protest movement," and have been labelled
"sanction-bait." United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102, 103 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted).
62. See supra text accompanying note 13.
63. Guthrie v. Sawyer, 1989-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9139, at 87,134 (N.D. Okla.
1989).
64. Id. at 87,136.
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ment against certain of their property were invalid because the govern-
ment had not adhered to its own written procedures in making the
assessment that gave rise to the liens. 65 Again, the record showed that
this was not the case. 66 The district court ruled that the quiet title stat-
ute waives sovereign immunity as to this claim. 6 7 On the merits, how-
ever, the claim was not successful, and the district court held the
assessment and the liens to be valid.
Finally, the W6lses asserted various claims in connection with the
levy and seizure of their property. The Wellses claimed that the govern-
ment had failed to record the assessment against them, had failed to
issue a Notice of Assessment and Demand for Payment,68 and had failed
to issue a notice of intent to levy. Relying on the above-quoted lan-
guage in Schmidt,6 9 the district court held that the quiet title statute does
not waive sovereign immunity as to these claims, as the validity of a tax
lien was not at issue. The district court granted summary judgment for
the Commissioner.
3. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 70 affirmed the dis-
trict court as to its disposition of the issues concerning the Guthries, but
reversed as to the matters concerning the Wellses. The court of appeals
had no difficulty in agreeing with the district court that the section 6213
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act waives sovereign immunity as to
the Guthries' claims attacking the validity of a Notice of Deficiency, and
that section 2410, the quiet title statute, waives sovereign immunity as to
the Guthries' claims contesting the validity of the government's tax
lien.
7 1
As to the claims raised by the Wellses, however, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's conclusion that no waiver
of sovereign immunity is worked by the quiet title statute.7 2 The matter
was therefore remanded for further proceedings, to allow the Wellses
the opportunity to develop their challenge. 73 In reversing the district
65. Id.
66. The government submitted Certificates of Assessment and Payments on various
Forms 4340, detailing the assessments against the Guthries. Id. Such certificates are "rou-
tinely used to prove that tax assessment has in fact been made." Geiselman v. United
States, 961 F.2d 1, 4 n.1 (1st Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). See also Hughes v. United
States, 953 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1992); Gentry v. United States, 962 F.2d 555, 557 (6th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Chila, 871 F.2d 1015, 1017-18 (1 1th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 975 (1989); United States v. Miller, 318 F.2d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 1963); United States
v. Nuttall, 713 F. Supp. 132, 135 (D. Del. 1988), aff'd, 893 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir. 1989);
United States v. Dixon, 672 F. Supp. 503, 505-06 (M.D. Ala. 1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1478
( lIth Cir. 1988).
67. See Geiselman, 961 F.2d 1.
68. See supra text accompanying note 40.
69. See supra text accompanying note 56.
70. The three-judge panel consisted of Chief Judge McKay, Judge Seymour, and
Judge Ebel.
71. Guthrie v. Sawyer, 970 F.2d 733, 737 (10th Cir. 1992).




court as to the disposition of the Wellses' claims, the court of appeals
was forced to reexamine its determination in Schmidt that "[slection
2410 does not extend to challenges for procedural irregularities in as-
sessment of collection of taxes." 74 Perceiving an "inconsistency" be-
tween other statements in Schmidt and this latter statement, the court of
appeals proceeded to "disapprove the latter statement and specifically
hold that [the quiet title] statute does waive sovereign immunity with re-
spect to procedural violations arising from assessment, levy, and
seizure." 7 5 Thus, "[u]nder our holding today, procedural deficiencies
with respect to recording assessments and issuing notices and demands
for payment may now be brought under section 2410. ' 76 An "alleged
failure of the IRS to assess properly or to send valid notices of assess-
ment and demands for payment are procedural defects cognizable in a
quiet title suit."
77
The court also felt inclined to "take this opportunity to discuss the
interrelationship of the quiet title statute and the statutory exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act, and to clarify those challenges that may prop-
erly be brought under each provision."17 8 The court first took issue with
the holding of Robinson and similarly-decided cases which held that a
taxpayer must show a lack of remedy at law to invoke the section 6213(a)
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.7 9 Noting that "[o]ne leading com-
mentator has stated that '[slection 6213 does not require a showing of
irreparable injury as a prerequisite to injunctive relief,' "80 the court
adopted this as the "better view:"
The purpose of the statutory exception is to preserve the tax-
payer's right to litigate his tax liability in the Tax Court before
paying the tax. If the availability of a refund suit after payment
prohibits the taxpayer from obtaining an injunction to protect
his right to litigate first, that right is virtually meaningless.
Under this approach, this right would be available only on a
showing that the taxpayer could not pay the tax. We have diffi-
culty believing that Congress intended to give with one hand
and take back with the other.
8i
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals then noted that, unlike the re-
sult in Robinson, the court in Elias8 2 had not allowed the taxpayer to raise
defects in a Notice of Deficiency in the context of a quiet title action. 8 3
As seen above, this ultimate holding is consistent with the Tenth Cir-
74. Id. at 735.
75. Guthrie, 970 F.2d at 735 (emphasis added).
76. l& at 739. A claim that the Service never sent a notice of intent to levy also falls
within the jurisdictional scope of section 2410. See National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v.
Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1246 n.6 (10th Cir. 1989).
77. Guthrie, 970 F.2d at 737.
78. Id. at 736.
79. Id. at 736-37; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
80. Guthrie, 970 F.2d at 736 (quoting J. MERTENS JR., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION § 49E.39 (1991)).
81. Id. at 736.
82. See supra text accompanying note 47.
83. Guthrie, 970 F.2d 736.
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cuit's view. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit found itself unable to
"agree with that court's apparent position that a taxpayer invoking the
statutory exception to the Anti-Injunction Act premised on the failure to
receive a Notice of Deficiency must also show the lack of an adequate
remedy at law."' 84 Thus, while in accord with the ultimate holding of
Elias, the Tenth Circuit was not in agreement with its reasoning: "In
sum, we hold that a taxpayer may obtain injunctive relief under section
6213(a) based on the failure to receive a deficiency notice notwithstanding
the availability of a refund suit. '" 8 5 The court reiterated, however, that
"a taxpayer is not entitled to raise [the] procedural defect [of lack of
receipt of a Notice of Deficiency] in a quiet title action because the pur-
pose of a deficiency notice is to enable a challenge in the Tax Court to
determine the amount of the assessment.",
8 6
C. James v. United States
8 7
1. Facts
Ronald James was a self-styled "citizen of the Republic of Wyo-
ming" who therefore believed he was "not a person required to file a
return on I.R.S. form 1040."88 After James ignored Notices of Defi-
ciency mailed to him proposing assessments in respect of tax years 1981
and 1984, the Internal Revenue Service assessed a deficiency against
him and proceeded to levy against his wages. James brought suit against
the government under section 2410, attempting to quiet title to his
wages, and protesting a variety of government actions in connection
with the assessment and levy.
2. Results in the District Court
James' pro se action raised a host of objections to the Service's as-
sessment and levy activities, including: (1) that no valid Notice of Defi-
ciency had been sent to him; (2) that the Service failed to lawfully assess
the deficiency; (3) that the Service failed to serve a Notice of Assessment
and Demand for Payment on him; and (4) that no notice of intention to
levy was ever sent to him. In an opinion not officially published, the
district court concluded that, fairly read, James' various challenges
amounted to a suit questioning the propriety of the assessment itself -
that is, the validity of the Notice of Deficiency - and in accordance with
Schmidt, dismissed the action in its entirety.8 9
84. Id. at 736-737.
85. Id. at 737.
86. Id.
87. 970 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1992).
88. Id. at 754 n.8.
89. 1991-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,347 (D. Wyo. 1991).
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3. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals90 affirmed all as-
pects of the district court's opinion, except that portion which dismissed
James' claim that he had never been sent a notice of intent to levy for
one of the years in question. Citing its very recent opinion in Guthrie,
the court stated that section 2410 "does not waive sovereign immunity
for claims that the taxpayer does not owe the taxes in question" 9 ' and,
therefore, "does not apply to challenges surrounding notices of defi-
ciency."'9 2 However, the court reiterated its conclusion in Guthrie that an
alleged failure of the Service to correctly enter the assessment or prop-
erly send valid Notices of Assessment and Demands for Payment are
procedural defects that may be challenged in a quiet title suit.93
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the bulk of
James' claims were not, in fact, addressed to the procedural validity of
the assessment and levy process, but to the validity of the assessment
itself - that is, the procedural and substantive validity of the Notice of
Deficiency. In order to invoke section 2410, James had argued that the
alleged invalidity of the Notice of Deficiency rendered all following as-
sessment and levy activities infirm, and thus he was in effect challenging
the latter as well as the former. 94 However, the Court of Appeals saw
this argument for what it was, a "domino form of logic" 9 5 that was un-
availing. The court stated that "the bulk of plaintiff's action is based on
the merits of Mr. James' underlying tax liability, not the procedure used
to notify him of the deficiency or the procedure used to collect it." 9 6
In order to give James' pro se action the benefit of the doubt,97 the
Court of Appeals went on to discuss each of James' claims that could
arguably extend to the validity of the Service's assessment and collection
activities, and thus fall within the scope of a section 2410 quiet title ac-
tion.9 8 As to allegations that the Service failed to enter the assessment
properly and failed to send James a Notice of Assessment and Demand
for Payment for each of 1981 and 1984, the court simply noted that the
record and evidence amply demonstrated that no such failures oc-
curred. 99 However, the court determined that James' uncontroverted
testimony that he was never sent a notice of intent to levy with respect to
the levy made to satisfy the 1981 deficiency raised a genuine issue that
90. The three-judge panel was comprised of Judge Logan, Judge Barrett, and Judge
Ebel.
91. James v. United States, 970 F.2d 750, 753 (10th Cir. 1992).
92. Id. at 755. "In any event, the record establishes that the IRS mailed notices of
deficiency for both 1981 and 1984 to Mr. James." Id. at 755, n.10.
93. Id. at 53.
94. James, 970 F.2d at 753.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 754.
97. Pro se complaints are to be interpreted less stringently than those drafted by law-
yers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
98. James, 970 F.2d at 754-55.
99. Id. at 755.
1993]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
precluded summary judgment.10 0 Thus, the district court was reversed
on this point and the case was remanded for a determination whether
the levy for 1981 was valid.' 0 '
D. Summary
The court of appeals' opinions in Guthrie and James provide a wel-
come clarification and expansion of taxpayers' rights in the Tenth Cir-
cuit to challenge various phases of the assessment, collection, levy, and
seizure activities of the Internal Revenue Service. It is now clear that
taxpayers who for one reason or anther may have missed their opportu-
nity to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of their tax defi-
ciency may nevertheless obtain injunctive relief under certain
circumstances from improper government actions without having to pay
the deficiency and sue for a refund. Pursuant to the statutory exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act provided by section 6213, taxpayers may seek
to enjoin assessment and related activities if a defect in the Notice of
Deficiency giving rise to the assessment can be proved. Significantly, a
taxpayer in the Tenth Circuit may seek injunctive relief under section
6213 without the need to show a lack of an adequate remedy at law. The
court of appeals' view on the latter issue places it squarely in the minor-
ity, and creates a conflict among the circuits.10 2
Similarly, taxpayers may contest the following items in a quiet title
action, pursuant to section 2410, without the need to demonstrate the
lack of an adequate remedy at law: (1) the assessment process (includ-
ing claims that the assessment was never entered or that the Notice of
Assessment and Demand for Payment was not properly mailed); (2) the
levy and seizure process (including a claim that the notice of intent to
levy was not properly mailed, or that the seizure and sale procedures
employed by the Service did not comply with statutory and regulatory
requirements);10 3 and (3) the validity of the government's tax lien (in-
cluding claims alleging procedural and substantive defects in the lien).
However, the taxpayer may not raise issues of defect in connection with
the Notice of Deficiency in a quiet title action.
Taxpayers being pursued by the Internal Revenue Service are often
among the persons least likely to be able to afford to pursue their rights
in a refund suit brought in district court or the Claims Court. The fed-
eral government, on the other hand, enjoys virtually unlimited re-
sources. The court's clarification of the right of taxpayers to obtain
equitable relief in the described circumstances serves to somewhat level
the playing field and ameliorate the significant imbalances in personal
and financial resources between taxpayers and the government.
100. Id. at 756.
101. Id. at 757.
102. See supra note 52.
103. See Aqua Bar & Lounge, Inc. v. United States, 539 F.2d 935, 939 (3d Cir. 1976).
For a description of the Service's internal procedures and guidelines concerning liens,




III. TENTH CIRCUIT CLARIFIEs REDEMPTION PERIODS APPLICABLE TO
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
MINNESOTA V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 10 4
A. Background
Under the Internal Revenue Code, the United States is granted 120
days in which to redeem real property sold in foreclosure to satisfy a lien
prior to the government's lien. 10 5 Under Colorado law, the general re-
demption period is only 75 days.' 0 6 Certain notice provisions must be
complied with at both the federal level' 0 7 and at the state level' 0 8 in
connection with redemptions out of foreclosure. The interplay of these
federal and Colorado redemption provisions was at issue in Title Insur-
ance Company of Minnesota.' 0 9
B. Facts
Lynn and Judith Olsen owned certain real property in Adams
County, Colorado. Security Industrial Bank held a first deed of trust on
this property, which was also subject to several junior tax liens, as well as
a junior deed of trust in favor of Dan Savage. On April 26, 1989, Secur-
104. 963 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1992).
105. I.R.C. § 7425(d) (1988) provides that "[i]n the case of a sale of real property ...
to satisfy a lien prior to that of the United States, the Secretary may redeem such property
within the period of 120 days from the date of such sale or the period allowable for re-
demption under local laws, whichever is longer."
106. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-302(1) (1992 Supp.) provides as follows:
Except as provided in this section with respect to agricultural real estate, within
seventy-five days after the date of the sale of real estate by virtue of any foreclo-
sure of a mortgage, trust deed, or other lien or by virtue of an execution and levy,
the owner of the premises or any persons who might be liable upon a deficiency
may redeem the premises sold by paying to the public trustee, sheriff, or other
proper officer the sum for which the property was sold, with interest from the
date of sale at the default rate if specified in the original instrument or if not so
specified at the regular rate specified in the original instrument, together with any
taxes paid or other proper charges as now provided by law, and a certificate or
redemption shall be executed by the proper officer and recorded, and the public
trustee, sheriff, or other public officer shall forthwith pay said money to the
holder of the certificate of purchase.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-303(1) (1992 Supp.) provides in part:
If no redemption is made within the redemption period provided for in section
38-38-302, the encumbrancer or lienor having the senior lien . . . on the sold
premises ... subsequent to the lien upon which such sale was held may redeem
within ten days after the expiration of the above redemption period by paying the
amount required by section 38-38-302, and each subsequent encumbrancer and
lienor in succession shall have and be allowed a five-day period to redeem, ac-
cording to the priority of his lien.
107. Treas. Reg. § 301.7425-4(b)(4)(ii) (1976) states as follows:
Before the expiration of the redemption period applicable under [I.R.C. § 74251,
the district director shall, in any case where a redemption is contemplated, send
notice to the purchaser (or his successor in interest of record) by certified or
registered mail or hand delivery of [the purchaser's] right . . . to request ...
payment in the event the right to redeem under section 7425(d) is exercised...
for a payment made to a senior lienor.
108. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-103(2) (1973) provides as follows: "No lienor or en-
cumbrancer is entitled to redeem unless, within the [75-day] redemption period provided
for in section 38-19-102, he files a notice of his intention to redeem with the public trustee,
sheriff, or other officer making the sale."
109. 963 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1992).
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ity Industrial Bank caused the property to be sold in a public trustee's
sale." 0 The purchasers of the property at the public trustee's sale were
Neal and Judy Goldsmith. On July 26, 1989, Savage redeemed the
property from the Goldsmiths, and received a public trustee's deed on
July 27, 1989.
In mid-August, 1989, Virginia Muwwakkil, a Revenue Officer of the
Internal Revenue Service, telephoned Savage to advise him that the Ser-
vice intended to redeem the property, and inquired about the amount of
money Savage had spent in redeeming and repairing the property. Sav-
age did not provide the requested information, nor did he appear on
August 24, 1989, at a meeting scheduled by Muwwakkil at the offices of
Title Insurance Company of Minnesota for the purpose of delivering a
check to Savage to reimburse him for the money he had spent redeem-
ing and repairing the property. On August 24, 1989, the 120th day after
the April 26, 1989 foreclosure sale, the Service filed a certificate of re-
demption on the property with the office of the Adams County Clerk
and Recorder. The certificate of redemption stated that the Service had
tendered payment to Savage in the amount of $33,645.46 by a check
dated August 23, 1989.
On August 30, 1989, the Service notified Savage of its intention to
foreclose upon the property. Savage instituted proceedings in district
court against the Service on September 25, 1989,111 and then conveyed
his interest in the property to Title Insurance Company of Minne-
sota.'1 2 The title company subsequently joined the action through an
amended complaint, seeking an adjudication and declaration that it was
the owner of the property, free and clear of any lien claimed to exist in
favor of the United States. The title company asked that the govern-
ment be enjoined from asserting any further claim in and to the prop-
erty. Both the title company and the Service moved for summary
judgment. By virtue of the action filed by Savage and joined by the title
company, the validity of the certificate of redemption filed by the Service
on August 24, 1989, was placed at issue.
C. Result in the District Court
In a unreported decision, the district court granted the title com-
pany's motion for summary judgment, while denying the Service's mo-
tion. In so holding, the district court concluded that the Service's
certificate of redemption did not comport with applicable federal and
Colorado statutes, and well as applicable federal regulations." t 3 As a
threshold matter, the district court determined that there was no federal
preemption of the Colorado redemption statutes by the federal redemp-
110. Id. at 298. Security Industrial Bank first provided the Internal Revenue Service
with notice of the foreclosure, as required by I.R.C. § 7425(c) (1989).
111. Presumably pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1978), the "quiet title" statute ana-
lyzed in the Guthrie case, supra notes 60-86.
112. Title Ins. Co., 963 F.2d at 299. Title Insurance Company of Minnesota had insured




tion statutes 14 _ that is, there was no ecpress preemption provision con-
tained in the federal statutes or regulations, and further, there was no
implied preemption by federal law arising out of an "actual conflict" be-
tween state and federal law. 1 5 The district court went on to conclude
that, in filing its certificate of redemption, the Service had not complied
either with the Colorado statute that requires the Service to file a notice
of intent to redeem within 75 days of the date of sale, 116 or with the
Treasury Regulations 1 7 that require the Service to send notice of a con-
templated redemption to the purchaser before the expiration of the re-
demption period. 18
D. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment, but differed with the district court's
conclusions of law concerning the interplay of the federal and Colorado
redemption statutes. The court of appeals first addressed the conclu-
sions of the district court concerning the question whether the federal
redemption statute preempted the Colorado redemption statute. The
lower court had concluded that it saw "[n]o conflict [between the re-
spective statutes] which would warrant application of the preemption
doctrine to the state [redemption] statute." 119 However, there was
some confusion as to whether the district court had actually concluded
that, due to the lack of conflict, the 75 day redemption period set forth
in the Colorado statute applied to the Service, and that, therefore, the
Service's notice given 120 days after the foreclosure sale was un-
timely. 120 The court of appeals put this question to rest by noting, as
the parties were forced to concede, that "it would be error if the district
court had in fact held that the 75 day redemption period .... somehow
applied to the IRS."' 2 ' If the lower court had held that the 75 day re-
demption period applied to the Service, "then such would conflict with
the 120 day provision in 26 U.S.C. § 7425(d) and the latter would pre-
vail."' 2 2 Thus, if the issue were simply "whether the 75 day period to
redeem provided by the Colorado statute, or the 120 day period to re-
deem provided by a federal statute controls ..... under the Supremacy
114. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2, federal law
preempts and invalidates state law which interferes with or is contrary to federal law. See,
e.g., Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
115. Title Ins. Co., 963 F.2d at 300.
116. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-39-203 (1992 Supp.)
117. Treas. Reg. § 301.7425-4(b)(ii) (1976).
118. Title Ins. Co., 963 F.2d at 301.
119. Id. at 300.
120. Id. at 301. Part of the confusion arose over the fact that CoLo. REV. STAT. 38-39-
102 (1973) applies on its face to the "owner" of the foreclosed property or to any person
who might be liable for a deficiency, and does not apply to a lienor. The Court of Appeals
reserved judgment as to whether the Colorado statute was therefore simply not applicable
to the Service.
121. Title Ins. Co., 963 F.2d at 301.
122. Id.
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Clause the federal statute would control."' 123 The 120 day federal re-
demption period, and not the 75 day Colorado redemption period, was
therefore held to apply to the Service.
The court of appeals next addressed the conclusion of the district
court that the Service had not complied with the requirements of the
Colorado statute stating that the redeeming party must file a notice of
intent to redeem within 75 days of the foreclosure sale, 124 and having
failed to file that notice, its later certificate of redemption was defective.
The lower court "apparently concluded that although the IRS may have
120 days under federal law to file its certificate of redemption, under
[the Colorado statute] it nonetheless had to file within 75 days" a notice
of intent to redeem. 12 5 The court of appeals disagreed, noting that:
[One hundred twenty] means, to us, 120 days, and a state stat-
ute ... requiring IRS to file within 75 days a 'notice of inten-
tion' to redeem conflicts with, and impinges upon, the 120 days
provided by federal statute. Under the Supremacy Clause, the
federal statute preempts the state statute. 12 6
The court of appeals did agree with the district court, however, in
its determination that the Service had not complied with applicable
Treasury Regulations 12 7 requiring the Service to send notice of a con-
templated redemption to the purchaser before the expiration of the re-
demption period. On this point, the Service argued that the verbal
notice given by Muwwakkil to Savage in August of 1989 satisfied the
requirements of the Regulation, despite the fact that the Regulation ex-
pressly calls for notice to be given by registered or certified mail. The
court of appeals disagreed, as had the district court. In view of the Ser-
vice's failure to comply with the Regulation, the court of appeals held




The opinion in Title Insurance Company of Minnesota lays to rest any
question as to the proper redemption period applicable to the Internal
Revenue Service when it seeks to redeem property which has been sold
in a foreclosure sale in Colorado. The Service may rely on the 120 day
redemption period provided in the Internal Revenue Code, which
123. Id
124. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-39-203 (1992 Supp.)
125. Title Ins. Co., 963 F.2d at 301.
126. Id.
127. Treas. Reg. § 301.7425-4(b)(4)(ii) (1976).
128. Cf. Colorado Proprieties Acquisitions, Inc. v. United States, 894 F.2d 1173, 1174
(10th Cir. 1990), where the foreclosing lending institution gave the Service notice under
I.R.C. § 7425(c)(1) by regular mail, not certified or registered mail as required by the stat-
ute. Despite the fact that the Service conceded it timely received the notice, the notice was
held not to comply with the statute, and was, therefore, invalid. Id. at 1175. Comparing
these facts to the situation faced in Title Insurance Company of Minnesota the Court of Appeals
viewed Colorado Properties Acquisitions as a case where the "shoe was on the other foot." Title
Ins. Co., 963 F.2d at 302.
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preempts Colorado's 75 day period. The Service also need not provide
a "notice of intent to redeem," otherwise required under Colorado law
to be given within 75 days of the foreclosure sale, any earlier than the
120 day period. However, Title Insurance Company of Minnesota points out
that the courts will strictly apply the statutory and regulatory require-
ments imposed upon the Service in the context of redemptions. Persons
seeking to challenge a redemption by the Service should. carefully con-
sider whether the Service has fully, and timely complied with the regula-
tions' requirements.'
29
IV. DEFERRAL OF PARTICIAPTION INTEREST INCOME DID NOT CLEARLY




The Internal Revenue Code provides that a taxpayer must include
and report items of gross income in the taxable year in which the item is
received by the taxpayer, unless under the method of accounting used
by the taxpayer in computing taxable income, such item is to be prop-
erly included in some other tax year. '3 ' A principal method of account-
ing employed by many taxpayers which causes items of income to be
reported in a tax year other than the year of receipt is the accrual
method of accounting.132 Under the accrual method of accounting, "in-
come is to be included for the taxable year when all the events have
occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the amount
thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy."' 3 3 The foregoing
is commonly known as the "all events" test. Under this two-part test,
income is accrued and must be reported when (1) the taxpayer has a
fixed right to receive the income and (2) the amount of the income can
be determined with reasonable accuracy.'
3 4
With certain exceptions,' s 5 the taxpayer is free to choose the
method of accounting that he will utilize in computing taxable income.
However, if the method selected by the taxpayer does not "clearly re-
flect income" in application, the Internal Revenue Service is authorized
to require the taxpayer to compute taxable income using a method that,
129. See generally Treas. Regs. § 301.7425-4 (1976).
130. 965 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1992).
131. I.R.C. § 451(a) (1989).
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1992 amendment). The other principal method of
accounting, which does generally tax items of gross income in the taxable year of receipt,
is the cash receipts and disbursements method. Under the cash receipts and disburse-
ments method of accounting, "all items which constitute gross income (whether in the
form of cash, property, or services) are to be included for the taxable year in which actually
or constructively received. Expenditures are to be deducted for the taxable year in which
actually made." Id. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i). See also id. §§ 1.451-1(a), 1.461-1(a)(2).
133. Id. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (emphasis added); see also id § 1.451-1(a).
134. See Kent Homes, Inc. v. United States, 512 F.2d 395, 397 (10th Cir. 1975); Spring
City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184-185 (1934).
135. For example, the accrual method of accounting is required for all taxpayers for
whom the production, purchase, or 'sale of merchandise is a material income-producing
factor. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1989).
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in the opinion of the Service, does clearly reflect income. '3 6 The forego-
ing principles apply not only to the overall method of accounting of the
taxpayer, but also to the accounting treatment of any particular item. 
1 3 7
It is well settled that the Commissioner has broad discretionary powers
in determining whether the accounting method used by a taxpayer
clearly reflects income, and in requiring taxpayers to switch to another
method of accounting that, in the Commissioner's opinion, does clearly
reflect income.1
3 8
In Commissioner v. Hansen,13 9 the Supreme Court held that participa-
tion interest, held back in reserve accounts to guarantee payment of
contingent liabilities, must be reported by accrual basis taxpayers in the
year the paper is sold. In Hansen, three retail automobile and trailer
dealers - accrual basis taxpayers - sold installment paper on a dis-
counted basis to various finance companies. The finance companies
held back a portion of the face value of the paper in a reserve account, as
security for the payment of contingent liabilities arising out of guaran-
tees given to the finance companies. The reserve account was credited
as payments were actually made on the paper. When the balance in the
reserve exceeded certain amounts, additional payments were made to
the dealers. The dealers argued that the presence of the reserve ar-
rangement prevented a conclusion that they had a present and enforcea-
ble right to the future payments, thus failing the first half of the "all
events" test. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the taxpayers
had in fact acquired a fixed right to receive the payments in the future.
The fact that the taxpayer did not have a right to presently recover the
reserve was of no consequence. All the events had occurred to fix the
right to receive the payment, and only the passage of time was necessary
in order for the payments to be received. Focussing on the second half
of the two-part "all events" test, the dealers also argued that the amount
of income could not be ascertained with reasonable accuracy. Again, the
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that because the amounts in the re-
serve would either be paid over to the taxpayers or applied to their guar-
antees, the dealers would under any circumstance receive the benefit of
the amounts held back. Hansen has been widely followed.14
0
In Resale Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner,14 1 the Tenth Circuit was
called upon to review the Commissioner's determination that the tax-
payer's method of accounting for certain "participation interest" earned
in the sale of consumer paper generated by its mobile home sales clearly
reflected income.
136. I.R.C. § 446(b) (1988).
137. Treas. Regs. § 1.446-1(a)(1) (1992).
138. See Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 467 (1959); United States v. Hughes
Properties, 476 U.S. 593, 603 (1986).
139. 360 U.S. 446 (1959).
140. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 829 (1962); General Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 293 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 816 (1962); Morgan v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1960); Kli-
mate Master, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 85 (1981).




Resale Mobile Homes 14 2 was engaged in the sale of mobile homes
in Denver, Colorado, under the name "Mobile World," and reported its
income under the accrual method of accounting. Its customers often
purchased mobile homes on credit, signing consumer paper that called
for the payment of the amount financed over a stated period of time, in
installments, with interest. The practice of Resale Mobile Homes was to
immediately sell the paper to one of two finance companies, either Mid-
land Federal Savings and Loan Association of Denver or Advance Mort-
gage Co., who became the servicers of the paper. Under its agreements
with the finance companies, Resale Mobile Homes received the full prin-
cipal amount of the consumer paper sold, and also became entitled to
receive the excess of the total amount of interest scheduled to be col-
lected from the mobile home purchaser during the life of the paper,
over the total amount of interest the finance company charged the tax-
payer based on a "buy rate." This excess was known as Resale Mobile
Homes' "participation."
Each payment received by the finance companies was applied first to
interest, based upon the actual number of days elapsed since the last
payment, on a simple interest basis.' 43 The reminder of the payment
was applied to principal reduction. Under this method, the amount of
interest accrued with respect to each payment depended solely on the
date the payment was actually received by the finance company, and not
on the date the payment was due. Thus, unless one were to assume that
each payment would be made exactly on its due date, the amount of
interest accruing under the consumer paper and the amount of Resale
Mobile Homes' participation interest therein could not be exactly deter-
mined in advance.
The finance companies paid participation interest to the taxpayer
over time, as they actually received the payments giving rise to the par-
ticipation interest. Thus, each time a payment was received, the finance
company would calculate the amount of the payment allocable to inter-
142. The company is referred to as the taxpayer throughout this discussion.
143. This method of applying payments received from the mobile home buyers was
fashioned to conform to CoLo. REV. STAT. § 5-2-210 (1973), as amended by the Colorado
legislature on October 28, 1975, to eliminate the use of the so-called "Rule of 78's" in the
event of the prepayment of a consumer loan. Under the Rule of 78's, the amount of inter-
est allocable to each time period during the term of a loan is determined by multiplying
the total interest payable over the loan term by a fraction, the numerator of which is the
number of periods remaining on the loan at the time the calculation is made, and the
denominator of which is the sum of all time periods during the loan term. Resale Mobile
Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1085, 1088 n.I (1988). The effect of this method is
to cause a greater amount of interest to be allocated to the initial periods of a loan than
would be the case if interest were economically accrued based on the number of days
elapsed applying the stated interest rate to the then-outstanding principal balance of the
loan. Because the Rule of 78's effectively and artificially retards the rate at which the prin-
cipal amount of the loan is reduced, it works to the disadvantage of a consumer who
desires to pay the loan off early. The 1975 amendment to COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-2 10
precludes the use of the Rule of 78's in calculating the balance due upon the prepayment
of a consumer loan.
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est. After then applying the buy rate to determine how much of that
interest was to be retained by the fiance company, it remitted the re-
mainder of the interest to Resale Mobile Homes. 14 4 On its tax returns
for the years in question, Resale Mobile Homes reported the participa-
tion interest as it was actually paid over to it by the finance companies,
and not as a lump sum amount at the time the paper was sold. On audit,
the Commissioner determined that Resale Mobile Homes should have
accrued all the participation interest in the year the consumer paper was
sold, on the theory that its right to receive the interest was fixed and the
amount was reasonably determinable. Resale Mobile Homes timely filed
a petition for redetermination with the United States Tax Court.'
45
C. Result in the Tax Court
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner, 14 6 holding that the
participation interest in respect of a particular piece of consumer paper
should have been accrued and reported by the taxpayer in the year that
the paper was sold to the finance company. As to the first prong of the
two-part "all events" test, the court held that the taxpayer "acquired a
fixed right to receive the participation interest when it sold the con-
sumer paper to the finance companies. While [the taxpayer] could not
compel the finance companies to immediately pay over the participation
interest, such is not the key to the accrual of income." 1 47 The taxpayer
also contended that the second half of the "all events" test was likewise
not satisfied, because the amount of participation interest that would be
paid by the finance companies on any particular piece of consumer pa-
per could not be determined with reasonable accuracy. The Tax Court
responded by noting that "while the word 'accuracy' means exactness or
precision, when modified by the word 'reasonable' it implies something
less than an exact or completely accurate amount."' 148 All that is neces-
sary is that the amount be accrued "on the basis of a reasonable esti-
mate," 14 9 and when the exact amount is determined later upon receipt,
144. The taxpayer's agreement with Advance Mortgage Co. provided that Advance had
the right to maintain a "reserve account" to which the participation interest would be
credited. Once the reserve account reached certain specified levels, the held-back partici-
pation interest would be paid out to the taxpayer over the life of the paper. The purpose
of the "reserve account" was to provide Advance with security for the taxpayer's undertak-
ing to repurchase any paper as to which certain warranties proved to be untrue. Resale
Mobile Homes, 91 T.C. at 1087. The warranties included that the paper complied with fed-
eral, state, and local law; that the paper was free of set-offs, defenses, and counterclaims;
and that the paper was secured by a valid first lien on the mobile home. The arrangement
with Advance provided that once the amount of participation credited to the reserve ac-
count exceeded five percent of the outstanding principal amount of the paper, the excess
would be payable to the taxpayer. d. at 1089. The record indicated, however, that Ad-
vance never exercised its right to maintain a reserve account. d. at 1087-89. No breach of
warranty ever occurred. Id.
145. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
146. Resale Mobile Homes, 91 T.C. at 1093.
147. Id. at 1094.
148. Id. at 1095.
149. Id. In fact, Resale Mobile Homes prepared estimates of the amount of participa-
tion income due under the contracts and reflected the accrued amount in income for finan-
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"any difference may be included in income or deducted, as appropriate,
in the year in which the correct amount is determined."' 5 0 The Tax
Court concluded that:
[T]he amount of deferred finance income payable to [the tax-
payer] was capable of reasonable estimation at the time of sale of
the new consumer paper. The amount of such income could be
calculated through amortization tables .... We recognize that
there my be some variation in the final amounts received by
[taxpayer] due to the default of purchasers or other prepay-
ment of the paper. However, this factor alone does not prevent
[taxpayer] from accruing the amount estimated.... We do not
believe that any variance in amount, due to periodic or late pay-
ments, would be of such significance as to prevent [taxpayer]
from making a reasonable estimate of the amount to be re-
ceived or that any errors in such estimation would stand incapa-
ble of correction in a later year.151
D. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the deter-
mination of the Tax Court. 152 In addressing the first half of the "all
events" test, Resale Mobile Homes attempted to distinguish its arrange-
ments with Midland Federal Savings and Loan Association of Denver
and Advance Mortgage Co. from the arrangements present in Hansen
and its progeny. Specifically, the taxpayer argued that in those cases,
funds were actually paid into reserve accounts, and the dealers were as-
sured of receiving the money in the reserve funds once they reached a
-certain level. Resale Mobile Homes contrasted that arrangement with
the one employed in the present case, where no payments were made
into a reserve account, and the taxpayer would not be contractually enti-
tled to receive any participation interest until the mobile home purchas-
ers actually made payments on the consumer paper. The purchasers'
monthly payments were thus argued to be conditions precedent to any
right on the part of Resale Mobile Homes to receive any participation
interest.
The Tax Court had disposed of this argument by noting that the
present arrangement, which reflected a "holding back" of the participa-
tion interest until it was actually received by the finance companies, was
simply an economic equivalent of the reserve fund approach, and served
the same purpose of ensuring that no interest was paid back to the
dealer until the finance company was assured of payment. 153 The Tenth
Circuit agreed with this analysis, concluding that the presence or ab-
sence of reserve accounts made no difference to the outcome. 154 While
cial accounting purposes. The estimates were based upon amortization schedules that
assumed all required monthly payments would be made as scheduled. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Resale Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 965 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1992).
153. Resale Mobile Homes, 91 T.C. at 1094.
154. The taxpayer had argued that, although the documents gave Advance Mortgage
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the court acknowledged that the taxpayer was required to wait for pay-
ment until the finance companies received payment from the mobile
home purchasers, this merely created a technical "condition precedent,"
and in substance the arrangement "is no different from ... agreements
with reserve accounts; [the taxpayer] still will receive participation inter-
est less any amount of interest not actually paid due to prepayment or
default."' 15 5 This delay "in reality is an issue of timing and does not
make the payment of participation interest less certain or genuinely
conditional." 1
5 6
The Tenth Circuit noted that although the exact amounts ultimately
paid over to Resale Mobile Homes might vary based upon the timing of
receipts by the finance companies, as well as prepayments and defaults,
this was no different from the economic effect of the arrangement in
Hansen. The Court of Appeals thus agreed with the Tax Court that the
first half of the "all events" test was satisfied, because:
[The taxpayer's] right to receive participation interest was
firmly established upon sale of the consumer paper to a finance
company. The finance company was legally obligated to pay
the participation interest to [taxpayer] when it bought the con-
sumer paper. Although the duty of the finance company to
make payment was deferred until it received payment from the
purchasers, both the mobile home purchasers and the finance
companies were obligated to make their respective payments.
[The taxpayer] was not required to take any additional action in
order to receive the participation interest.
15 7
Turning to the second prong of the "all events" test, the Tenth Cir-
cuit again agreed with the Tax Court, concluding that the participation
interest was susceptible of determination with reasonable accuracy. The
court acknowledged that the amount of participation interest on each
contract might "vary based on whether mobile home purchasers make
their monthly payments on time, early, or late" and that "[c]ertainly
Co. the option of establishing reserve accounts, Advance never did so, thus taking this case
outside the scope of Hansen. The Tenth Circuit noted that the presence or absence of
reserve accounts "is of no moment" because the "reserve accounts are simply bookkeep-
ing entries, and '[o]n questions concerning the taxability of income, we are to be guided by
facts and not by bookkeeping entries.' " Resale Mobile Homes, 965 F.2d at 823 (quoting
Commissioner v. North Jersey Title Ins. Co., 79 F.2d 492, 493 (3d Cir. 1935)). In any
event, the fact that Advance never exercised the right to require the reserve account was
"evidence that operation without reserve accounts was in substance no different from op-
erating with reserve accounts from [the taxpayer's] point of view." Id.
155. Id. at 824. Prior to the tax years in question, the taxpayer and the finance compa-
nies had operated under agreements that called for the establishment of reserve accounts,
but did not contain any provision for the monthly calculation of participation interest in
the manner called for under the current agreements. The prior agreements had been
replaced by the current versions in response to the new restrictions placed on the use of
the Rule of 78's under Colorado law, see supra note 140. During the years that the prior
versions of the agreements were in place, Resale Mobile Homes had accrued the participa-
tion interest and reported it in its entirely in the year the consumer paper was sold to a
finance company, in accordance with Hansen.
156. Resale Mobile Homes, 965 F.2d at 824.
157. Id. at 823.
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some payments will be early and others late."1 58 However, "on the ag-
gregate [the taxpayer] should be able to reasonably estimate interest
amounts in advance."'
59
The Tenth Circuit thus affirmed the Tax Court's conclusion that the
"all events" test was satisfied, and that the Commissioner could require
Resale Mobile Homes to accrue and currently report all participation
interest due over the life of the consumer paper in the year the paper
was sold to a finance company. The Commissioner was, therefore,
found to be correct it his determination that the procedure used by Re-
sale Mobile Homes to report the participation interest did not "clearly
reflect income," and more specifically, that such procedure was an im-
proper application of the accrual method of accounting.
E. Summary
The decision in Resale Mobile Homes represents yet another example
of the courts' willingness to elevate substance over form when attempt-
ing to classify transactions for federal income tax purposes. Although
there were indeed some differences in the finance company agreements
present in Resale Mobile Homes and those in Hansen, the differences were
properly seen to be merely of a technical nature, and not cause for draw-
ing a distinction between the two. Resale Mobile Homes is also reflective of
the great deference that is paid by the courts to the Commissioner in
reviewing determinations by the Commissioner in the tax accounting
area. As noted, the Commissioner has broad discretion in determining
that an accounting method used by a taxpayer does not "clearly reflect
income" or has otherwise been improperly applied, 160 and these deter-
minations are widely honored by the courts.
V. PAYMENTS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF A CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATION ARE "INVOLUNTARY" AND CAN BE APPLIED
BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS IT MAY SEE
FIT: IN RE FULLMER
16 1
A. Background
It has for some time been the position and practice of the Internal
Revenue Service that when a taxpayer makes a "voluntary" payment on
a tax liability, the taxpayer may designate how he wants the payment to
be applied. 16 2 The courts agree that a taxpayer can direct how volun-
tary payments are to be applied.163 When the payment is "involuntary,"
however, or if the taxpayer fails to designate how the payment is to be
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See supra text accompanying note 137.
161. 962 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1992).
162. See Rev. Rul. 79-284, 1979-2 C.B. 83.
163. Wood v. United States, 808 F.2d 411,416 (5th Cir. 1987); O'Dell v. United States,
326 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1964).
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applied, the Service will allocate the payment as it chooses.' 64 In distin-
guishing between voluntary and involuntary tax. payments, the Tax
Court, in Amos v. Commissioner,165 described an involuntary payment as
"any payment received by agents of the United States as a result of dis-
traint or levy or from a legal proceeding in which the Government is
seeking to collect its delinquent taxes or file a claim therefor."' 66
Whether or not payments made by a debtor in the context of a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization are to be considered voluntary or
involuntary is a question that has not received a consistent response
from the courts. The question usually arises in response to attempts by
debtors to designate class seven 16 7 tax payments, first, to the "trust
fund" portion of employment taxes, and then to other taxes, including
the "non-trust fund" portion of employment taxes.
Employment taxes generally fall into one of two categories, "trust
fund" taxes and "non-trust fund" taxes. Amounts withheld by an em-
ployer from an employee's wages, such as the employee's withheld in-
come taxes and the employee's share of social security taxes, are
considered to be held -by the employer in trust for the government
pending their payment over to the Internal Revenue Service. 168 Such
taxes are generally referred to as the trust fund portion of employment
164. Muntwyler v. United States, 703 F.2d 1030, 1032 (7th Cir. 1983).
165. 47 T.C. 65 (1966)
166. Id. at 69.
167. The priority of certain federal tax liabilities under the Bankruptcy Code may be
briefly summarized as follows:
A taxpayer's prepetition federal income tax liability is afforded class seven priority in the
distribution of the bankruptcy estate if (i) the liability arose in respect of a taxable year that
ended on or before the date of the filing of the petition, and the last due date of the return
for such year occurred not more that three years immediately before the petition date, (ii)
the claim is for a tax assessed within 240 days before the filing date of the petition, with
enlargements of that time if an offer in compromise was pending, or (iii) the claim is for
certain nondischargeable taxes not assessed prior to the commencement of the case, but
still assessable. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A) (1988). Also afforded class seven priority are
taxes required to be collected or withheld and paid over, and employment taxes on prepe-
tition compensation earned from the debtor for which a return is last due after three years
before the petition filing date. Id. § § 507(a)(7)(C) and (D). Penalties relating to any of the
foregoing which compensate for an actual pecuniary loss also receive class seven priority.
Id. § 507(a)(7)(G).
Claims for postpetition federal income taxes incurred by the estate during the period of
administration are asserted through a request for payment of administrative expenses.
They share the priority afforded to administrative expenses generally, which are entitled to
class one priority in the distribution of the estate. Id. §§ 503(b)(1) and 507(a)(1). Prepeti-
tion taxes, and prepetition taxes only, are excluded from class one priority by virtue of
having been relegated to class seven priority. United States v. Redmond, 36 B.R. 932
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1984). Penalties accruing on postpetition debt may also be asserted
against the estate as a class one priority. II U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(C). Likewise, interest ac-
cruing on such debt receives class one priority. United States v. Cranshaw (In re Allied
Mechanical Serv., Inc.), 885 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Ledlin (In re
Mark Anthony Constr., Inc.), 886 F.2d 1101, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Friendship College, Inc., 737 F.2d 430, 433 (4th Cir. 1984).
Tax liabilities incurred following confirmation of the plan of reorganization are those
of the debtor, not the bankruptcy estate, and generally are not affected by the bankruptcy
filing.
168. I.R.C. § 7501(a) (1992).
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taxes. 169 The employer's matching share of social security taxes, as well
as federal unemployment taxes, constitute the non-trust fund portion.
When a corporation fails to pay its trust fund taxes, the United
States Treasury suffers the loss, because the employees from whose
wages the amounts were withheld nevertheless are credited in full for
the withheld amounts even though they are not paid over to the govern-
ment. To remedy this situation, section 6672 of the Internal Revenue
Code provides that persons who are required to collect, truthfully ac-
count for, and pay over any tax - such as the trust fund portion of
employment taxes - and who willfully -fail to do so, are liable to the
government for the full amount of the amounts not collected, accounted
for, or paid over. 170 The people determined to be those required to
collect, truthfully account for, and pay over the taxes are referred to as
"responsible persons." The section 6672 penalty, also known as the
"100 percent penalty,"' 7 is frequently asserted by the Service when
withheld trust fund taxes are left unpaid by a corporation. The penalty
is usually assessed against officers, directors, and shareholders of a cor-
porate employer, plus others with check-signing authority.
Voluntary payments made by an employer and designated to be ap-
plied to the trust fund portion of employment taxes will be so applied by
the Service. However, where the payment is involuntary, or where the
taxpayer otherwise fails to request a specific allocation, the Service will
allocate employment tax payments to the non-trust fund portion that it
would otherwise never collect. 172 This way, the Service maximizes the
likelihood that the overall employment tax liability will be satisfied, as
the Service remains free to pursue the principals of the corporation for
the trust fund portion, in the form of the 100 percent penalty.
173
As noted, a corporate debtor that is the subject of a Chapter 11
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code will often attempt to pro-
pose a plan of reorganization that, among other things, seeks to apply its
class seven tax payments first to the trust fund portion of employment
taxes, and then to the non-trust fund portion and other taxes. Its goal in
proposing this allocation is to maximize the amount of trust fund taxes
169. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1978).
170. I.R.C. § 6672 (1988).
171. Although these exactions are frequently termed a penalty, such description "does
not alter their essential character as taxes." United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275
(1978).
172. "Once the corporation is out of business, the United States can kiss goodbye any
non-trust fund taxes owed it but not paid." United States v. Schroeder, 900 F.2d 1144,
1146 (7th Cir. 1990).
173. It has been held that the pendency of a corporate bankruptcy does not prevent the
Service from pursuing the principals of the corporate debtor to collect the 100 percent
penalty, as the latter is a "separate and distinct" obligation. United States v. Huckabee
Auto Co., 783 F.2d 1546, 1548 (11 th Cir. 1986). However, the courts are in disagreement
as to whether the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to determine the section 6672 liability
of the principals of a corporate debtor, when they themselves are not "debtors" in the
bankruptcy. Compare In re Brandt-Airflex Corp, 843 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1988) and Huckabee,
783 F.2d at 1546 with Quattrone Accountants, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service, 895 F.2d
921 (3d Cir. 1990).
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that would be paid off in the bankruptcy proceeding for which the
debtor's principals might be held personally liable under section 6672 if
the reorganization proves unsuccessful. 1
74
The questions whether the Bankruptcy Court has equitable jurisdic-
tion to confirm a plan that provides for such an allocation, 175 and
whether the debtor otherwise has the right to request such an allocation,
have deeply divided the courts. The reported opinions reveal the courts
to be in complete disagreement over several important issues bearing on
the question, including: (1) whether a Chapter 11 reorganization is "a
legal proceeding in which the Government is seeking to collect its delin-
quent taxes or file a claim therefor;"' 176 (2) a proper resolution of the
conflicting interests of the "fresh start" policy manifested in the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the tax collection goals reflected in the Internal Revenue
Code, and the need to protect innocent creditors; and (3) identifying the
"realities of bankruptcy" that impact the question.
Several courts have held tax payments made in the context of a
Chapter 11 reorganization to be involuntary. In In the Matter of Ribs-R-
Us, Inc.,1 7 7 the corporate debtor filed a proposed Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization providing that the government's class seven priority tax
claims would be paid in full over the statutory maximum six-year pe-
riod.' 78 The plan further provided that all payments in class seven
would be applied first to reduce the trust fund portion of the debtor's
employment taxes. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the plan over the
government's objection that such payments were involuntary and could
be applied by the Service in any manner the Service determined. The
Bankruptcy Court disagreed with the government, holding the payments
to be voluntary. The district court, relying on the Eleventh Circuit's de-
cision in In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning,179 affirmed. As discussed
174. The corporate debtor may not obtain a discharge for unpaid trust fund employ-
ment taxes. Such taxes are class seven priority obligations, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(C)
(1988), which are not dischargeable in proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, id. § 523(a)(l)(A). The non-trust portion is nondischargeable as well, if the return
was last due, including extensions, after three years before the date of the bankruptcy
petition. Also nondischargeable are (1) taxes entitled to class two priority (so-called "in-
voluntary gap" claims), id.; (2) tax debts with respect to which a return was never filed, id.
§ 523(a)(1)(B)(i); (3) tax debts with respect to which a return was field late, and within two
years of the petition, i § 523(a)(l)(B)(ii); and (4) taxes as to which the debtor made a
fraudulent return or willfully attempted to evade or defeat the tax, id. § 523(a)(1)(C). Pen-
alties that accrue on nondischargeable federal income tax obligations are also nondis-
chargeable. See id § 523(a)(7). Interest on nondischargeable tax obligations is likewise
nondischargeable. Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 360 (1964); Allen v. Romero,
535 F.2d 618, 623 (10th Cir. 1976).
175. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court is empowered to confirm a
plan of reorganization that "include[s] any... appropriate provision not inconsistent with
the applicable provisions of" the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5). See also id.
§ 1129. More generally, the court is empowered to "issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of" the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
§ 105(a). See also id. § 505 (1988 and Supp. III 1992) (granting the Bankruptcy Court the
power to determine the validity and amount of taxes).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
177. 828 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1987).
178. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1988).
179. 823 F.2d 462 (11 th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 486 U.S. 1002 (1988).
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below, the Eleventh Circuit in A & B Heating & Air Conditioning held that
the allocation question is one best left to judicial determination on a
case-by-case basis. On appeal in Ribs-R-Us, the Third Circuit reversed
the district court, specifically breaking with the Eleventh Circuit and
holding that the payments were involuntary. In doing so, the Third Cir-
cuit stated its strong preference that the question be determined strictly
as "a question of law rather than an issue for the exercise of discretion.
A uniform federal rule is preferable so that debtors, creditors, and the
Internal Revenue Service will be able to know in advance whether the
debtor can make such a designation and guide their decisions
accordingly." 180
The debtor in Ribs-R-Us had argued that payments made in the
Chapter 11 setting do not fall within the scope of the payments de-
scribed in the Amos definition, 18 in view of the flexibility afforded to
reorganizing debtors to propose and implement the amount and timing
of payments. The Third Circuit disagreed, holding that, given the broad
powers granted to the Bankruptcy Court over the debtor in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy and considering that once a plan of reorganization is con-
firmed the debtor operates under an express judicial order, the Amos
standard was met.1
8 2
The Third Circuit in Ribs-R-Us viewed any contrary holding as "in-
consistent with the realities of bankruptcy."' l8 3 That reality, according
to the Third Circuit, is that:
[d]ebtors who file under any chapter of the bankruptcy code
have few, if any, options. As a practical matter, they file bank-
ruptcy because it is a last chance for a relatively ordered finan-
cial liquidation or rehabilitation rather that the out-of-control
financial debacle facing them on the eve of bankruptcy.
184
Finally, the debtor in Ribs-R-Us argued that certain provisions of the
180. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 202. The debtor argued that the success of the reorganiza-
tion depended on the participation of two of the corporation's principals, who would not
be willing to make a proposed cash infusion into the debtor if the trust fund taxes were not
extinguished. In response, the Third Circuit pointed out that since the classification of the
payment was being determined as a matter of law, the court's decision did not "depend
upon whether a particular reorganization could have been effected without permitting the
debtor to designate taxes. In any event, the proposed reorganization plan was not contin-
gent upon the court's approval of the designation." Id. at 204.
181. Amos v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 65, 69 (1966). See supra text accompanying notes
165-66.
182. See also In Re Frost, 47 B.R. 961, 965 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985):
In order to determine whether a payment to the IRS is voluntary or involuntary, it
must be determined whether or not the payment was received through court or
administrative action which resulted in an actual seizure of the property or
money. The instant bankruptcy proceeding filed by the debtors is a legal action in
which the IRS has filed a claim for delinquent taxes. The payments to be made by
the debtors are under the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and are made pursuant
to a plan which must comply with the requirements of the bankruptcy code.
Thus, we conclude that payments made by the debtors to the IRS are not volun-
tary and the IRS has the right to allocate the payments as it sees fit.
183. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203.
184. Id. at 203 (quoting In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc., 68 B.R. 463, 469
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (Volinn, Bankr. J., dissenting)).
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Bankruptcy Code evince congressional intent as "essentially
subordinat[ing] the federal policy for protection of the revenue [as set
forth in 26 U.S.C. § 6672] to the competing federal policy of promoting
successful Chapter 11 reorganizations."'18 5 Discerning no support in
the legislative history for this contention, 'and finding no specific authority
in the Bankruptcy Code for directing payments in a way that would con-
travene the policy underlying section 6672, the Third Circuit disagreed.
In In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc. ,186 prior to filing a Chapter
11 plan of reorganization, the debtor filed a motion seeking permission
to make payments to the Service designated to be in reduction of its
trust fund liability. The debtor "readily acknowledge[d] that by
designating application of the payments first to the trust fund portion of
its liability, it [was] attempting to reduce the personal liability of its re-
sponsible persons" under section 6672.187 The government opposed
the motion. The Bankruptcy Court granted the motion, and the bank-
ruptcy appellate panel affirmed in a split decision.18 8 The government
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In the meantime, the debtor had paid the
trust fund portion in full and the plan had been confirmed.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that "[flederal courts
have struggled with the voluntary/involuntary distinction in the bank-
ruptcy context and have come to different conclusions."'' 8 9 The court
went on to reverse the bankruptcy appellate panel, holding that "pay-
ments made by a debtor-in-possession after filing a petition for reorgan-
ization under Chapter 11, but prior to confirmation of a reorganization
plan, are involuntary and the bankruptcy court does not have equitable
jurisdiction to order otherwise."190 The debtor first argued that a bank-
ruptcy proceeding is not the kind of "legal proceeding" contemplated
by the Amos standard, in that the payments were not due to any enforced
collection procedures or the participation of the government in the
bankruptcy proceedings. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. After reviewing
various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code highlighting the extent of the
court's involvement and the nature of the protections afforded to the
debtor in a Chapter 11 reorganization, the court concluded that:
by filing a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11, TKO used
the authority of the court to keep its creditors at bay while it
reorganized and regained financial stability. TKO is not free to
abuse this system by designating its payments in a way that ben-
efits only its responsible persons, and possibly harms other
creditors, including the IRS, without the scrutiny of the court
or other creditors.'
9'
The debtor also argued that the equity jurisdiction of the Bank-
185. Id. at 203.
186. 833 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1987).
187. Id. at 801.
188. In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc., 68 B.R. 463 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986). See
Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203.
189. Technical Knockout, 68 B.R. at 801-02 (footnote omitted).
190. Id at 802.
191. Id. at 803.
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ruptcy Court authorized it to order that payments be applied first to the
trust fund taxes. 192 Again, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that, to
the extent that the Bankruptcy Court's order rested on its equitable ju-
risdiction, "[s]uch a decision is not within the bankruptcy court's equita-
ble jurisdiction" and to allow the bankruptcy court to designate how
payments are to be applied as between trust fund and non-trust fund
taxes without notice to creditors or court approval "would subvert the
Bankruptcy Code."' 9 3 The court thus held that "the IRS is entitled to
apply TKO's payments as the IRS sees fit" to preserve the right of the
IRS to pursue the responsible persons under section 6672.194
Under facts similar to those present in Ribs-R-Us, the Bankruptcy
Court in DuCharmes & Co. v. Michigan (In re DuCharmes & Co.), 19 5 con-
firmed the debtor's Chapter 11 plan of reorganization only after striking
out provisions that would have allocated payments first to trust fund
taxes. The district court reversed, holding that such payments were vol-
untary and could be allocated any way the debtor preferred. On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, stating in a brief opinion
that "we agree with the Third and Ninth Circuits that payments made to
the IRS on pre-petition tax liabilities by a Chapter 11 debtor ought to be
considered 'involuntary payments' that may not be allocated to pay the
debtor's trust fund liabilities first."' 9 6
Other courts have held tax payments made in the context of a Chap-
ter 11 proceeding to be voluntary. In In re A & B Heating & Air Condition-
ing,19 7 the corporate debtor had proposed a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization that provided for payment of the debtor's federal tax lia-
bility over the statutory six-year period, with payments to be first applied
to trust fund taxes. It was recognized that "[b]y paying off the trust fund
taxes, the corporate president and sole shareholder would be relieved of
his separate liability under [section 6672] for these trust fund taxes." 
19 8
The plan was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, over the govern-
ment's objection.' 9 9 The district court affirmed. On appeal, the Elev-
192. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that, in fact, the bankruptcy court had not specifi-
cally ordered the Service to apply the payments to the trust fund liability, but rather to
apply the payments as the debtor requested. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 852 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1988).
196. Id. at 196.
197. 823 F.2d 462 (11 th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded for consideration ofmootness ques-
tion, 486 U.S. 1002 (1988).
198. Id. at 463.
199. In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 53 B.R. 54 (Bankr, S.D. Fla. 1985). The
bankruptcy court stated:
Court involvement in the context of a Chapter 11 reorganization case is not the
type which results in seizure of property or money as in a levy. Unlike a taxpayer
faced with a government instituted collection proceeding which may lead ulti-
mately to levy upon the taxpayer's assets, a Chapter 11 debtor enjoys a great
latitude in how and if a'plan is proposed and thus how and when the IRS will be
paid.... The debtor propounding a plan has a number of options with respect to
treatment of a claim by the IRS and it is the freedom afforded by theses options
which dictates the conclusion that payments to the IRS pursuant to a confirmed
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization are voluntary.
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enth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in turn, holding that "the
allocation question in a Chapter 11 case . . .should be left to judicial
discretion to be decided on a case-by-case basis."
'20 0
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the conflicting results of prior
decisions, describing them as:
[A] direct result of the conflicting policies behind the Bank-
ruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code. On the one
hand, Congress, by enacting [section 6672,] intended to im-
pose liability upon corporate officers who allow trust fund taxes
to be used for any purpose other that the payment of withheld
taxes.
On the other hand, Congress has enacted a detailed Bank-
ruptcy Code which sets forth an orderly process by which credi-
tors of a bankrupt entity are entitled to be repaid. In doing so,
Congress "has provided bankrupts with extensive protection
from their creditors and a reasonable opportunity for rehabili-
tation not only for their benefit but for that of the public as
well."... The Code expresses a preference toward reorganiza-
tion rather then liquidation; a viable reorganization plan typi-
cally provides greater payment to creditors while preserving
the economic life of the entity.
20 1
The Eleventh Circuit found the policy of the Bankruptcy Code to
outweigh that of the Internal Revenue Code. That policy, in turn, was
undermined by classifying the tax payments as involuntary, which in
many cases would be "detrimental to the reorganization plan" because
the incentive of the corporate officers to support the plan would be re-
duced, and "[firequently, the efforts put forth by these officers during
the reorganization is the corporation's only hope for future viability."
'20 2
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[p]ermitting the Internal Revenue
Service to allocate tax payments in all Chapter 11 proceedings runs con-
trary to" the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code, and "decline[d]
to accept that argument of the IRS that all payments made under a
Chapter 11 reorganization are involuntary and thus property allocated
by the IRS."
' 20 3
Rather than hold the tax payments to be voluntary as a matter of
Id. at 57.
200. In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d at 465, (quoting In re B & P Enter-
prises, Inc., 67 B.R. 179, 183 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986)).
201. Id. at 464-65 (citation omitted).
202. Id. at 465. Citing to a law review article, the court noted that:
If corporate officers are pressured to pay the taxes out of their own pockets, the
incentive to continue successful reorganization is reduced, and it becomes more
likely that the responsible officers will convert to Chapter 7 liquidation. Under
Chapter 7, as in Chapter 11, taxes have priority; the government will be paid in
full whether sufficient funds remain for other unsecured creditors or not. The
responsible officers are guaranteed that no tax penalty will be assessed against
them personally.
Id. (quoting Note, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction and the Power to Enjoin the IRS, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 1279, 1299-1300 (1986)).
203. Id. (emphasis added).
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law, however, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the equitable jurisdiction of
the Bankruptcy Court and held that the allocation question "should be
left to judicial discretion to be decided on a case-by-case basis. ' 20 4 The
court of appeals remanded to the district court "with directions that the
bankruptcy court weigh the impact the proposed allocation would have
upon the debtor, Internal Revenue Service, and other creditors.1
20 5
In In re Lifescape, Inc.,206 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Colorado held employment tax payments made in a Chapter 11 reor-
ganization to be voluntary, concluding that "[t]he fact that payments are
made pursuant to a plan which must comply with the requirements of
the Bankruptcy Code does not rise to the level of court action equivalent
to a levy, judicial order, execution or judicial sale" implicating the Amos
definition.
20 7
In United States v. Energy Resources Co. ,208 the question of whether the
Bankruptcy Court has the equitable power and jurisdiction to order that
payments made under a proposed Chapter 11 plan of reorganization be
allocated against the trust fund portion came before the Supreme Court.
The case actually consisted of two separate debtors whose appeals were
consolidated by the court of appeals. In one of the cases, a plan of reor-
ganization was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court over the govern-
ment's objection, providing that tax payments would be applied to
extinguish all trust fund taxes prior to the commencement of payment of
the non-trust fund portion. The district court affirmed. In the other
case, the Service refused to comply with the debtor's request to apply a
post-confirmation payment to the trust fund portion. In response, the
debtor obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court directing the Ser-
vice to so apply the payment. The district court reversed, holding that
the Bankruptcy Court did not have the power to do so.
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the cases
and accepted the government's contention that the tax payments were
involuntary. 20 9 However, the Court of Appeals went on to hold that,
notwithstanding the classification of the payments as involuntary, the
204. Id. (quoting In re B & P Enterprises, Inc., 67 B.R. 179, 183 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1986)). Relying in large part on factors set out in B & P Enterprises, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that the Bankruptcy Court is to consider the "equitable reasons warranting such
allocations" and should look to the history of the debtor; the absence or existence of
prebankruptcy collection or enforced collection measures of the Service against the corpo-
ration and "responsible persons;" the nature and contents of the Chapter 11 plan (e.g.,
whether it is a reorganization or a last resort liquidation); the presence, extent, and nature
of administrative and/or court action; the presence of pre- or post-bankruptcy agreements
between the debtor and the Service; and the existence of exceptional or special circum-
stances or equitable reasons warranting the allocation. See B & P Enterprises, Inc., 67 B.R. at
184. "Most importantly, the bankruptcy judge should consider whether the proposed plan
is merely a stop gap scheme to hold the taxing authorities at bay with little chance that the
debtor will fulfill its obligation under the plan." A & B Heating &Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d
at 466.
205. A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d at 466.
206. 54 B.R. 526 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
207. Id. at 529.
208. 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
209. In re Energy Resources Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1989).
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Bankruptcy Court had the authority to order the Service to apply such
payments to the trust fund portion of employment taxes if the Bank-
ruptcy Court concluded that this designation was necessary to ensure
the success of the reorganization. 2 10 The First Circuit thus struck a po-
sition consistent with that of the Eleventh Circuit, but opposed to that of
the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. Noting this conflict, the Supreme
Court granted certiori. The Supreme Court then affirmed the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in a brief opinion authored by Mr. Justice White.
After observing that several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
2 11
'are consistent with the traditional understanding that bankruptcy
courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-
debtor relationships,, '2 12 the Supreme Court addressed the govern-
ment's contention that other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code reflect a
policy that the Service be paid in full as to the debtor's tax liabilities, and
thus impose limitations on the Bankruptcy Court's equity power that
had been exceeded in these cases. 213 The government argued that if
payments can be allocated first to. the trust fund portion, it would be "at
risk" for the non-trust fund portions, which cannot be recovered from
the responsible persons. 2 14 On the other hand, if the Service is allowed
to apply tax payments to the non-trust fund portion first, it stands a bet-
ter chance of collecting the entire amount owed because the debt that is
not "guaranteed" by responsible persons in the form of the section
6672 penalty will be paid off before the guaranteed portion. The
Supreme Court responded by stating that:
[wihile this result might be desirable from the Government's
standpoint, it is an added protection not specified in the [Bank-
ruptcy] Code itself: whereas the Code gives it the right to be
assured that its taxes will be paid in six years, the Government
wants an assurance that its taxes will be paid even if the reor-
ganization fails - i.e., even if the bankruptcy court is incorrect
in its judgment that the reorganization plan will succeed.
21 5
The Supreme Court further noted that the order of the Bankruptcy
Court causing payments to be first applied to the trust fund portion does
not remove section 6672 from the field of play: "As the Government
concedes, § 6672 remains both during and after the corporate Chapter
11 filing as an alternative collection source for trust fund taxes." 21 6 The
Supreme Court thus held that the Bankruptcy Court "may order the IRS
to apply tax payments to offset trust fund obligations where it concludes
210. Id. at 234.
211. See supra note 174.
212. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. at 551.
213. The government noted that the Bankruptcy Code affords class seven priority sta-
tus to the tax claims at issue, see supra note 167, and makes them nondischargeable, see
supra note 173. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court is required to assure itself that the reor-
ganization plan will succeed, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11), and therefore, that the Service will
in all likelihood collect the tax debt owned. Energy Resources Co., 495 U. S. at 551.
214. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. at 551.
215. Id. at 549.
216. Id. at 551.
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that this action is necessary for a reorganization's success."
2 17
B. Facts
In In re Fullmer,2 18 the Internal Revenue Service had filed a proof of
claim in the taxpayer's Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding. After
confirmation of the plan of reorganization, the taxpayer paid the Service
the amount of the claim, apparently designating the payment to be ap-
plied to his postpetition tax obligations rather than his prepetition tax
debt. The Service refused to honor this designation, and applied the
payments to the prepetition debt. The Bankruptcy Court sided with the
Service, and the district court affirmed.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit opted to join the Third,
219 Sixth, 2 20
and Ninth Circuits2 2 1 and held that payments made by a debtor pursu-
ant to a Chapter 11 proceeding are involuntary. In its brief discussion of
the issue, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "[t]o interpret such pay-
ments otherwise would be inconsistent with the realities of bankruptcy
where a debtor is required to make such payments pursuant to an ex-
press judicial order. Thus, we conclude that Mr. Fullmer was not enti-
tled to direct the application of his payments to any particular tax
liability."' 222 The Service was, therefore, free to apply the payment as it
saw fit.
D. Summary
Although not arising in the context of a dispute over employment
taxes, the Fullmer decision would seem to have equal applicability to a
debtor's attempts to designate payments against the trust fund portion
of employment taxes to which the "100 percent penalty" imposed under
section 6672 applies, particularly since the Tenth Circuit, in reaching its
decision, relied entirely on the previously discussed cases arising under
section 6672 that were decided by the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.
However, the decision of the Supreme Court in Energy Resources Co. 
2 2 3
seems clearly to cast doubt on the rationales expressed by the Third,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits in support of their respective conclusions, and
renders those opinions somewhat doubtful authority.
It is to be kept in mind, however, that the Supreme Court in United
States v. Energy Resources Co. never reached the question of whether a
Chapter 11 debtor's tax payments are properly characterized as volun-
tary or involuntary. There remains a split among the circuits on this
217. Id.
218. 962 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1992).
219. See supra note 177.
220. See supra note 195.
221. See supra note 186.
222. In re Fullmer, 962 F.2d at 1468.
223. 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
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question, with the Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits viewing such
payments as involuntary, and the First and Eleventh Circuits viewing
them as voluntary. The Supreme Court did hold that the Bankruptcy
Court has the power in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction under
the Bankruptcy Code to order that tax payments are to first be applied
to the trust fund portion of employment taxes, and to confirm a plan of
reorganization that so provides, even if the payments are properly con-
sidered involuntary. To the extent that a Chapter 11 debtor in the
Tenth Circuit attempts to designate the application of tax payments
without the aid of a court order or an express provision in the plan of
reorganization supporting such an application, Fullmer indicates that the
debtor will not be successful. Given the decision of the Tenth Circuit in
Fuilmer, Chapter 11 debtors are well advised to propose plans of reor-
ganization that provide specifically for the allocation of class seven tax
payments, first, to the trust fund portion of the debtor's employment tax
liability, so as to maximize the possibility that the debtor's "responsible
persons" will not find themselves personally liable for the trust fund
portion. Payments made outside the context of a confirmed plan of
reorganization should be supported by a court order specifying this allo-
cation, if the debtor is still under the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy
Court.
In light of the fact that the Bankruptcy Court will issue orders or
confirm plans of reorganizations calling for such a designation of tax
payments only in the discretionary exercise of its equitable powers,
Chapter 11 debtors in the Tenth Circuit must be prepared to demon-
strate that such exercise of equitable jurisdiction is justified under this
circumstances. It is likely that factors such as those discussed by the
Eleventh Circuit in In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning will influence
the Bankruptcy Court's determination.2 24 It remains to be seen how
much flexibility will be afforded debtors in the Tenth Circuit in propos-
ing allocations of their tax payments.
VI. SUMMARY OF OTHER CASES DECIDED BY THE TENTH CIRCUIT
IN 1992
A. Some Decisions of Note
In Hall v. United States, 22 5 the Tenth Circuit ruled that the mitigation
provisions of I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 apply only in the context of the fed-
eral income tax, and therefore do not apply to the windfall profit tax.
2 26
The taxpayers owned a five percent overriding royalty interest in a fed-
eral oil and gas lease in Wyoming being operated by Amoco Production
Company. In 1986, the Bureau of Land Management of the Department
of the Interior reduced the number of the participating acres in the area,
224. See supra note 204.
225. 975 F.2d 722 (10th Cir. 1992).
226. The windfall profit tax was set out in I.R.C. §§ 4986 to 4990 prior to its repeal in
1988. See § 1941 of the Omnibus Trade and Competition Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1322 (1988).
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the effect of which was to reduce the Hall's net revenue interest to 1.923
percent. The reduction of participating acres was made retroactive to
1976. Amoco unilaterally recouped from the Halls the amount of excess
royalty payments made to the Halls prior to 1986 based upon the reduc-
tion in participating acres, and issued "corrected" Forms 6248, Annual
Information Return of Windfall Profit Tax, to the Halls for 1980 thor-
ough 1985. These forms, of course, indicated that as a result of the
reduction of participating acres and the Halls' interest therein, the Halls
had overpaid their windfall profit tax for each of those years. The tax-
payers successfully filed tax refund claims with the Service for each of
the years 1983 through 1985. However, as to the years 1980 through
1982, the Service disallowed the Halls' refund claim on the ground that
they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 22 7 The Halls,
understandably aggrieved at the resulting "whip-saw" being worked
upon them by two branches of the federal government, brought suit in
district court seeking to invoke the mitigation provisions of sections
131 1-1314.228 The district court allowed the claim, and entered judg-
ment for the Halls in the amount of $72,300. On appeal, however, the
Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that the mitigation provisions do not
apply to the windfall profit tax. The court noted that sections 1311-
1314, the mitigation provisions, are found in Subtitle A of Title 26,
U.S.C., which relates solely to income taxes. On the other hand, prior to
their repeal the windfall profit tax provisions were found in Subtitle D of
Title 26, U.S.C., which relates to "Miscellaneous Excise Taxes." After
reviewing the legislative history of the mitigation provisions, the Tenth
Circuit agreed with the government that these relief provisions could
not be invoked by the Halls. The Hall decision thus puts the Tenth Cir-
cuit on record as limiting the mitigation provisions of sections 1311-
1314 to the income tax sphere.
2 29
In Pottorf v. United States,230 the plaintiffs were shareholders in Pot-
227. I.R.C. § 6511 (a) (1988) requires tax refund claims to be filed within two years of
the payment of the tax or within three years from the filing of the relevant return, which-
ever is later.
228. Briefly summarized, the provisions of I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 are aimed at mitigating
the harsh effect of applicable statutes of limitation by recognizing that certain determina-
tions relating to a tax year, such as court determinations or final dispositions of refund
claims, may create "errors" such as the double inclusion or exclusion of income or the
double allowance or disallowance of deductions or credits in time-barred years. For exam-
ple, a Tax Court determination that a particular item of income is includable in a given
"open" year may create an accounting "error" if the taxpayer had actually included it in a
prior "closed" year and paid tax on it. The mitigation provisions of I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314
allow for a correction of the error through certain prescribed adjustments, despite the fact
that the prior year is closed by the statute of limitations.
229. But see Chertkof v. United States, 676 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1982). In Chertkof, the
Fourth Circuit invoked the mitigation provisions of § 1311-1314 to avoid a taxpayer whip-
saw that had both income tax and estate tax implications. See also the dissent filed in Hall
by Judge Garnett Thomas Eisele, Senior District Judge for the District of Arkansas sitting
by designation, voicing agreement with the "well-reasoned opinion of the district court in
this case" and the reasoning in Chertkof. Hall, 975 F.2d at 727.
230. Nos. 91-3365, 91-3366, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32797 (10th Cir. Dec. 2, 1992).
The decision is reflected in an unpublished Order and Judgement. Such Order has no
precedential value and may not be cited or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit,
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torf Farms, Inc., a Kansas corporation that forfeited its Articles of Incor-
poration when it failed to pay applicable state franchise taxes. Following
the forfeiture, the Internal Revenue Service filed notices of tax liens
against the corporation's real property in the local real property records.
When the real property was subsequently condemned, the IRS success-
fully claimed the condemnation proceeds in a state court proceeding. In
this appeal, the shareholders of Pottorf Farms, Inc., argued that once
the corporation had lost its charter, title to the corporation's property
passed by operation of law to the shareholders, and thus, the IRS's later-
filed lien was invalid. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out,
however, that under Kansas state law2 3 ' a corporation may continue to
act for three years following its dissolution for the purpose of winding
up its affairs. Although the corporation had forfeited its Articles of In-
corporation, it continued to exist as an entity for the purposes of paying
its debts and disposing of its assets. The condemnation proceeds were
therefore determined to be the property of the corporation, not the
shareholders, and the IRS's lien was held valid.
B. Bankruptcy
In In re Bates,23 2 the debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.
The debtor had owned and operated a Wyoming lumber business as a
sole proprietorship. it was determined that the debtor owed the gov-
ernment $61,212.89 in federal employment taxes. Of this amount,
$39,714.72 were "trust fund" taxes and $21,498.17 were "non-trust
fund" taxes. 233 The IRS perfected its general tax lien2 3 4 for these
amounts by filing prepetition notices of lien. The value of debtor's as-
sets available to satisfy this lien amounted to $21,950, leaving the gov-
ernment unsecured as to most of the debt.23 5 ' The debtor presented a
Chapter 13 plan that proposed to classify the unpaid trust fund portion
as a class two priority claim that would be paid in full, and to classify the
remaining, non-trust fund portion as an unsecured claim that would be
paid pennies on the dollar. The debtor's presumed goal in proposing
this classification was to obtain a discharge for most of the non-trust
fund portion. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
determination that the trust fund portion was to be classified as a se-
cured claim, and that the non-trust fund portion was to be classified as a
class seven priority claim. 23 6 Due to the fact that priority tax claims in
bankruptcy are not dischargeable, 23 7 the effect of the court's classifica-
except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collat-
eral estoppel. 10th CiR. R. 36.3.
231. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6807 (1988).
232. 974 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1992).
233. See generally the discussion of the Fullmer case which appears supra notes 218-22.
234. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
235. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) provides that a claim secured by a lien on property is
considered "secured" to the extent of the value of the property, and "unsecured" to the
extent the amount of the creditor's interest exceeds the value of the property.
236. See supra note 168.
237. See supra note 174.
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tion was to deny debtor a discharge for any portion of the employment
taxes.
In In re Cassidy, Jr. ,238 the Tenth Circuit held that the ten percent
penalty imposed under I.R.C. § 72(t) on premature withdrawals from
pension plans, profit sharing plans, and IRA's 23 9 is not to be afforded
priority under the Bankruptcy Code.2 40 The first question addressed by
the court was whether the ten percent exaction was a "tax" that could be
afforded class seven priority.2 4 1 The court acknowledged that the ten
percent exaction is in fact labelled a "tax" under the Internal Revenue
Code, but concluded that "Congress' labelling of the section 72(t) exac-
tion as a tax is not determinative of its status for priority in bank-
ruptcy." 242 The court then went on to hold that, in view of the
ambiguous legislative history of section 72(t)243 and the acknowledged
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code provisions relating to priorities,2 4 4 the
ten percent exaction is properly characterized as a penalty and not a tax,
and is not to be afforded priority.2 4 5 The court further concluded that
the penalty was not entitled to class seven priority as "compensation for
actual pecuniary loss."
'246
238. 983 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1992).
239. I.R.C. § 72(t) (1988).
240. The question whether the 10 percent penalty is dischargeable in bankruptcy is left
open. If the penalty is not determined to be imposed in connection with a tax that is
nondischargeable, or if the withdrawal occurred more than three years prior to the date of
the bankruptcy petition, the penalty would be dischargeable. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)
(1988).
241. Il U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988) states as follows:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, only to the extent
that such claims are for -
(A) a tax on or measure by income or gross receipts.
242. Cassidy, Jr., 983 F.2d at 163. This conclusion places the Tenth Circuit in apparent
conflict with the Sixth Circuit, which has indicated its inclination to defer to Congress'
designation of a "tax" as such under the Internal Revenue Code. Id; see aLso United States
v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991).
243. A "tax" has been judicially defined to mean (1) an involuntary pecuniary burden,
regardless of name, laid upon individual or property; (2) imposed by, or under authority of
the legislature; (3) for public purposes, including the purposes of defraying expenses of
government or undertakings authorized by it; (4) under the police or taxing power of the
state." In re Lorber Industries of California, Inc., 675 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Tenth Circuit viewed the application of the third test as problematic. On the one
hand, it is possible to divine a "public purpose" underlying section 72(t), in that the exac-
tion could be argued to recapture a measure of tax benefits afforded under the qualified
retirement plan rules, and to promote savings. However, the legislative history of section
72(t) was equally susceptible of being read to indicate that the purpose of section 72(t) was
simply to penalize early withdrawals. Cassdy, Jr., 983 F.2d at 164.
244. This purpose of allowing priority claims is to compensate for a pecuniary loss
actually suffered, and not to afford priority to claims not reflecting a pecuniary loss, as the
latter would have the effect of depleting rather than conserving the bankruptcy estate and
punish innocent creditors. See Matter of Unified Control Systems, Inc., 586 F.2d 1036,
1038 (5th Cir. 1979).
245. Cassidy, Jr., 983 F.2d at 165.
246. Id. 11 U.S.C § 507(a)(7)(G) provides class seven priority for any "penalty related
to a claim of a kind specified in this paragraph and in compensation for actual pecuniary
loss."
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C. Tax Shelters
In Jackson v. Commissioner,24 7 Nickeson v. Commissioner,24 8 and Cannon
v. Commissioner,249 taxpayers were denied deductions for losses incurred
in tax shelter transactions found by the Tax Court2 50 to have been en-
tered into without a profit motive. 25 1 In Jackson, the taxpayer purchased
"territorial distributorships" from U.S. Distributors, Inc., entitling them
to distribute the jewelry products of American Gold & Diamond Corpo-
ration within designated territories. Based upon their initial investment
of $15,000, and the fact that theJacksons had executed documents obli-
gating them to pay $720,000 on a nonrecourse basis for territorial distri-
bution rights, theJacksons were encouraged by the tax shelter promoter
to deduct $60,000 on their 1982 federal income tax return. Believing
the arrangement to be an abusive tax shelter, the Jackson's accountant
refused to file the return on this basis, and instead deducted only the
Jackson's 1982 out-of-pocket expenditures incurred in acquiring the dis-
tribution rights. Relying heavily upon its 1985 opinion in Moore v. Com-
missioner25 2 involving the identical tax shelter arrangement, the Tax
Court concluded that the arrangement was so lacking in economic sub-
stance as to be a sham, and disallowed this deduction.2 53 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court "that the transaction was a
sham and that the Jacksons are not entitled to their claimed deduc-
tions."'2 54 Noting that either lack of a profit motive or lack of economic
substance can render a transaction a sham,2 55 the Tenth Circuit found
that various factors supported this conclusion, such as the lack of oper-
ating history of the promoting entities and their lack of goodwill, the
emphasis placed by the operative documents on the tax benefits repre-
sented to be available, the unrealistic financing arrangement, and the
fact that there was no demonstrated source of product. As to the profit
motive of the taxpayers, the Tenth Circuit determined that the Tax
Court was justified in finding that the taxpayers had no genuine expecta-
tion of profit, particularly considering the fact that the contract assigned
unspecified territories to them2 56 and the fact that theJacksons made no
247. 966 F.2d 598 (10th Cir. 1992).
248. 962 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1992).
249. 949 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1991).
250. Jackson v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2806 (1991); Cannon v. Commis-
sioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 164 (1990); Brock v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 826
(1989), aff'd sub nom. Nickeson v. Commissioner, 962 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1992).
251. Whether a taxpayer enters into a transaction in pursuit of economic profit is a
question of fact. The trial court's findings on that issue are not to be disturbed on appeal
unless they are "clearly erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P. 5 2 (a). The Supreme Court has in-
structed that: "[a] finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to sup-
port it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction
that the mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
252. 85 T.C. 72 (1985).
253. Jackson, 161 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2810.
254. Jackson, 966 F.2d at 601.
255. See Bohrer v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 344, 348 n.5 (10th Cir. 1991); Casebeer v.
Commissioner, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990).
256. Jackson, 966 F.2d at 601. The territories were assigned on a lottery basis after the
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attempt to research the industry or the companies.
The Jackson court cited Nickeson as support for its conclusions. 2 5 7 In
Nickeson, the Tax Court had disallowed the taxpayers' deductions under
I.R.C. § 17 4(a) (1988) for research and development expenses incurred
in developing an automatic meter reading device. 258 The taxpayers had
deducted the amount of money and the face amount of certain promis-
sory notes delivered to George Risk, the promoter of the arrangement
and a principal of George Risk Industries, Inc, of Kimball, Nebraska.
The offering documents stressed the tax benefits of participating in the
arrangement, which included a touted 4-to-1 write-off based on the ini-
tial cash investment, but gave no particulars concerning the manner in
which the technology was to be developed or any other economic as-
pects of the project. Recognizing that a taxpayer's entitlement to deduc-
tions under section 174 depends upon whether the taxpayer is engaged
in a "trade or business," 2 59 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that this
required an "initial inquiry into whether the 'activity was undertaken or
continued' in good faith, with the dominant hope and intent of realizing
a profit, i.e., taxable income, therefrom."' 260 Applying various tests, in-
cluding the nine factors listed in the "hobby loss" regulations under
I.R.C. § 183261 and the so-called Rose test, 262 and after reviewing past
decisions evaluating the presence or absence of profit motive in research
and development programs and related activities,2 63 the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the taxpayers "did not meet their burden to show they
entered the . . .program with a good faith intent to profit; rather, the
[arrangement] was 'the naked sale of tax benefits.' 264
investment was made, and the taxpayers seemed unconcerned about which territories were
assigned to them. Id.
257. Id. See also Kubler v. Commissioner, No 90-9019, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS (10th.
Cir. April 24, 1992) (Nickeson reasoning applied to deny deductions under I.R.C. § 174 for
development of components of variable opacity glass.) The Order and Judgment in Kubler
was unpublished, see supra note 219.
258. Nickeson v. Commissioner, 962 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1992).
259. I.R.C. § 174 (1988) allows the taxpayer to deduct "research or experimental ex-
penditures which are paid or incurred by him during the taxable year in connection with his
trade or business as expenses." Id. (emphasis added).
260. Nickeson, 962 F.2d at 976 (citations omitted).
261. I.R.C. § 183 (1988) precludes the deduction of so-called "hobby losses," that is,
activities "not engaged in for profit." Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972) outlines nine fac-
tors indicative of a good faith intent on the part of the taxpayer to recognize a profit.
Paraphrased, the factors are (1) the extent to which the taxpayer carries on the activity in a
businesslike manner, (2) the taxpayer's expertise or his reliance on the advice of experts,
(3) the time and effort the taxpayer expends in carrying on the activity, (4) the expectation
that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value, (5) the taxpayer's success in similar
activities, (6) the taxpayer's history of income or loss in the activity, (7) the amount of
occasional profits, if any, (8) the taxpayer's financial status, and (9) the elements of per-
sonal pleasure or recreation. Id.
262. In Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386 (1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989),
the Tax Court developed a two-step "generic tax shelter" and "economic substance" test
to determine the validity of deductions and credits derived from activities where the tax
benefit requires that the taxpayer's activities constitute either a trade or business or be
undertaken for the production of income, as required by I.R.C. § 162 & 212 (1988).
263. Nickeson, 962 F.2d at 977.
264. Id. at 977-978 (quoting Brock v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 836 (1989)).
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Finally, in Cannon v. Commissioner,2 65 the taxpayer had invested over
$800,000 in a Mexican gold and silver mining venture that never turned
a profit. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner 26 6 that the ex-
penditures were nondeductible under section 183.267 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals2 68 reviewed the application of the nine
hobby loss factors 269 to the taxpayer's investment activities in Mexico.
While it concluded that some of the factors supported the taxpayer and
others supported the government, "[taking all facts and circumstances
into account, we cannot say that the Tax Court's application of the [fac-





In Long v. United States,2 7 ' the Tenth Circuit held that the Service
did not unlawfully disclose tax information concerning the taxpayers by
sending notices of liens and levies to various financial institutions,
county recorders, the Colorado Department of Revenue, and the Social
Security Administration in an effort to collect a $138,961 jeopardy as-
sessment 27 2 against the taxpayers. The taxpayer had filed this action
against the Service claiming damages arising from the disclosures.
2 73
The Tenth Circuit held that disclosures made to the Colorado Depart-
ment of Revenue were statutorily authorized 2 74 under the Service's writ-
ten Agreement on Coordination of Tax Administration.2 75 Despite the
265. 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 164 (1990), aft'd, 949 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 3030 (1992).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 170. On appeal, the taxpayer objected to the invocation of I.R.C. § 183 by
the Tax Court, because that section had not been explicitly raised or considered by the
Service or the taxpayer. According to the taxpayer, only sections 162, 212 and 616 were at
issue and had been raised by the parties. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, concluding that
section 183 "is interrelated to sections 162 and 212, profit motive being the common
underlying theme." Cannon v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir. 1991). "In
determining whether the mining activity met the requirements of sections 162 or 212, the
court naturally applied section 183. Section 183 is often used in analyzing 'for profit'
issues, both in the context of hobby losses and in the context of trade or business ex-
penses." Id. Thus, "the Tax Court's application of section 183 was routine and predict-
able, not extraordinary." Id. at 349.
268. Cannon, 949 F.2d at 352.
269. See supra note 261.
270. Cannon, 949 F.2d at 352.
271. 972 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1992).
272. See I.R.C. § 6861(a) (1988).
273. I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1) (1988) provides that "[i]f any officer or employee of the
United States knowingly, or by reason of negligence, discloses any return or return infor-
mation with respect to a taxpayer ... such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages
against the Untied States in a district court of the United States." The confidentiality of
return information is protected by I.R.C § 6103(a) (1988).
274. I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1) (1988) authorizes disclosures by the Service to state agencies
if certain conditions are.satisfied, including that the disclosure be made "only upon written
request" of the agency, and only "to the representatives of such agency ... designated in
such written request." Id.
275. The IRS has entered into Agreements on Coordination of Tax Administration
with each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The Agreement is in standard
form, and prides, inter alia, that "[tihis agreement constitutes the requisite authorization
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taxpayer's arguments to the contrary, 27 6 the court further held that dis-
closures to financial institutions, county recorders, and the Social Secur-
ity Administration were clearly authorized under the Internal Revenue
Code2 77 and the Income Tax Regulations.
2 78
In Diandre v. United States,2 79 the district' court held that a Special
Agent of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue
Service improperly disclosed tax return information concerning the tax-
payer and his business. The agent had sent a "circular letter" to the
business' banks and customers requesting information concerning trans-
actions between the business and the recipients of the letter. The letter
informed the banks and customers that the Service was investigating the
taxpayer and the business, and disclosed certain information about the
taxpayer, such as his name, address, and status as a director of the com-
pany.2 80 As a result of the information obtained, summons were subse-
quently issued to all the banks. The district court held that the
information was disclosed in violation of I.R.C. § 6103.281 On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the determination of the
district court. The major area of disagreement between the parties was
pursuant to § 6103(d)(1) of the Code for IRS to disclose to, and permit inspection by, an
agency representative of Federal returns and Federal return information." Long, 972 F.2d
at 1178.
276. The taxpayer's arguments essentially amounted to a challenge to the sufficiency of
the assessment, and not to the disclosure procedures. The Service produced a certified
copy of Form 4340, "Certificate of Assessment and Payments," which was acknowledged
by the Tenth Circuit to be "sufficient evidence that an assessment was made in the manner
prescribed by § 6203 and Treas. Reg. 301.6203-1," which establish the applicable statu-
tory and regulatory requirements. Long, 972 F.2d at 1181. See supra note 65.
277. Under I.R.C. § 6103(k)(6) (1988), tax return information may be disclosed in the
course of an investigation if three requirements are met: (1) the information sought is
"with respect to the correct determination of tax, liability for tax or the amount to be
collected, or with respect to the enforcement of another provision" of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, (2) the information sought is "not otherwise reasonably available," and (3) it is
necessary to make disclosures of return information in order to obtain the additional infor-
mation sought.
278. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-(1)(b)(6) (1980) authorizes disclosures of tax return
information when necessary to "establish or verify the financial status or condition and
location of the taxpayer whom collection is or may be directed, [and] to locate assets in
which the taxpayer has an interest" in connection with "the establishment of liens against
... assets [in which the taxpayer has an interest], or levy on, or seizure, or sale of, the
assets to satisfy [the taxpayer's tax] liability."
279. 968 F.2d 1049 (10th Cir. 1992).
280. The letter stated:
The Internal Revenue Service is conducting an investigation of Metro Denver
Maintenance, Inc., Lakewood, Colorado, for the years 1983 through 1985. Mr.
DiAndrea is an officer of Metro Denver Maintenance whose address is 6800 West
6th Avenue, Lakewood, Colorado, 80215.
During the course of our investigation, we noted transactions between you and
Metro Denver Maintenance, Inc. and/or Mr. DiAndrea for [the] previously men-
tioned period. As part of our investigation, we need to verify the purpose of
these transactions. Your assistance is needed in determining all payments made
to or on behalf of Metro Denver Maintenance, Inc. and/or Mr. DiAndrea for the
previously mentioned period. We would appreciate you furnishing the informa-
tion indicated on Attachment 1, for use in a Federal tax matter.
Id. at 1051. The Attachment referred to "the date, check number, amount and form of all
payment(s) .. .made in cash, money order, etc." The Attachment specifically referred to
"payments made in the form of cash." Id.
281. See supra notes 273-78.
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whether the requirement of section 6103 that the information be "not
otherwise reasonably available" had been satisfied. The court of appeals
held that, because the letter requested information about possible cash
payments made by the recipients to the taxpayer or his business, and
because this information could not reasonably be obtained from any
other source, the statutory requirement was met. The court of appeals
also admonished that "[tihe district court strayed beyond the parame-
ters of section 6103 when it sought to determine lthe agent's] subjective
intent and when it concluded that insufficient justification was shown to
warrant delving into whether cash payments were made."12 8 2 The court
of appeals noted that:
section 6103 does not provide a vehicle to test the probable
cause or any other level of justification to investigate .... The
plain language of section 6103 does not limit in any way what
information the IRS may seek in the course of an investigation.
Section 6103 merely imposes certain restriction on the IRS's
ability to make disclosures in seeking that information. 283
In United States v. Dawes,2 84 the Tenth Circuit joined the Sixth 28 5
and Ninth 2 86 Circuits, as well as several district courts, 28 7 in holding
that a taxpayer's conviction for failure to file federal income tax returns
is not precluded by the fact that the Treasury Regulations and the in-
structions accompanying the tax forms do not carry an Office of Man-
agement and Budget 2 88 control number.28 9 Donald and Phyllis Dawes
had each pled guilty to three counts of willful failure to file federal in-
come tax returns2 90 for 1981, 1982, and 1983, but preserved for appeal
the question whether the lack of OMB control numbers excused their
failure to file. Relying on the reasoning of the other courts that previ-
282. DiAndrea, 968 F.2d at 1053.
283. Id.; see Barrett v. United States, 795 F.2d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1986) ("the court does
not inquire whether the information sought is necessary"); United States v. MacKay, 608
F.2d 830, 832 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating that the Service is not required to have probable
cause to issue a summons). On the other hand, the Service must use its summons author-
ity in good faith, and the courts may refuse to enforce a summons if it was issued to harass
the taxpayer or if it is unclear or overly broad. United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437
U.S. 298, 313 (1978); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964); United States v.
Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 686 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
284. 951 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1991).
285. United States v. Wunder, 919 F.2d 34, 38 (6th Cir. 1990).
286. United States v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1356, 1358-60 (9th Cir. 1991).
287. See United States v. Stiner, 765 F. Supp. 663 (D. Kan. 1991); United States v.
Burdett, 768 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Brewer v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 309
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. Crocker, 753 F. Supp. 1209, 1214-16 (D. Del. 1991).
288. Hereinafter referred to as the "OMB."
289. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812
(1980), the OMB is assigned the task to review all federal forms constituting "information
collection requests," 44 U.S.C. § 3507 (1988), and assignment of a control number to all
forms approved by the OMB. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3512, "no
person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to maintain or provide information to any
agency if the information collection request ... does not display a current control number
assigned" by the OMB. The taxpayers had argued that because the Income Tax Regula-
tions and the instructions do not contain OMB control numbers, they could not be penal-
ized for failing to file their income tax returns.
290. See I.R.C. § 7203 (1988).
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ously addressed the issue,2 9 1 the Tenth Circuit concluded that this argu-
ment was without merit.
2 92
In United States v. Gosnell,2 93 the taxpayer transferred all his assets to
a purported business trust. The Tenth Circuit determined that "the Dis-
trict Court properly ordered the foreclosure on the government's lien
after it determined that the transfer was fraudulent, '29 4 and rejected
various tax protest claims.
29 5
E. Annual Round-up of Tax Protestors, and Other Matters
During 1992, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disposed of vari-
ous tax protestor cases and other matters in a similar vein. These are
summarized in the following paragraphs.
In Fox v. Commissioner,2 96 the court affirmed the dismissal of a Tax
Court petition filed by a tax protestor who claimed "that she was 'brain-
washed' by one Sy Prog, apparently a tax protestor, into proceeding
before the Tax Court in the manner she did,"'2 9 7 and now wanted a
"second chance to produce evidence in the Tax Court. '298
In Pleasant v. Lovell,2 99 members of the National Commodity and
Barter Association, a national tax protest organization,3 0 0 sued certain
291. The analysis of each of the courts that has previously addressed the issue has va-
ied, but all the courts have come to the same conclusion. The reasoning has included that
the requirement to file a tax return is mandated by statute, not regulation, so the taxpayer
was not convicted of violating the regulations, see United States v. Wunder, 919 F.2d 34, 38
(6th Cir. 1990); that the explicit statutory requirement to file a tax return places the regu-
lations and instructions beyond the scope of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, United
Sates v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1991); and that the regulations and instructions
cannot be viewed independently and classified as "information collection requests" as de-
fined by the statute - they are merely subsidiary to the income tax forms, and assist
taxpayers in completing the return, Crocker, 753 F. Supp. at 1216. The Tenth Circuit was
most persuaded by the latter analysis. Form 1040, the personal income tax return form,
and its associated forms do carry OMB control numbers.
292. Dawes, 951 F.2d 1189. Subsequent 1992 Tenth Circuit cases following Dawes in-
clude United States v. Jump, No. 91-5183, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 27779 (10th Cir. Oct.
19, 1992) and Gassei v. Dep't ofJustice, No. 91-6400, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15381 (10th
Cir. June 25, 1992).
293. 961 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1992). For other 1992 decisions by the Tenth Circuit
relating to fraudulent conveyances, both decided to the same effect, see United States v.
Jensen, No. 91-4224, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 34732 (10th Cir. Dec. 29, 1992) and United
States v. Neilson, No. 91-4175, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 34823 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 1992).
294. Gosnel, 961 F.2d at 1520.
295. Gosnell's appeal was determined to be frivolous, and sanctions in the amount of
$1,500 were awarded to the government. Gosnell, 961 F.2d at 1521. See Casper v. Commis-
sioner, 805 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1986).
296. 969 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1992).
297. Id. at 952. Fox's petition asserted various claims that the Tenth Circuit acknowl-
edged to be "blatantly frivolous and groundless." Id.
298. Id.
299. 974 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1992).
300. The National Commodity and Barter Association "is an organization formed in
1979 which 'espouses dissident views on the federal tax system and advocates a return to
currency backed by gold and silver.'" United States v. National Commodity & Barter
Ass'n, 1990-1 U. S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,284 (quoting Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402,
405 (10th Cir. 1985)). The NCBA is especially active in the Tenth Circuit. The NCBA has
been described as an organization whose members "advocate dissident political views con-
cerning the tax and monetary policy of the United States Government," Kroll v. United
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government agents alleging violations of the group members' First
Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association, and
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure.3 0,
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of these
claims.
30 2
In Fostvedt v. United States,3 03 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's reliance on the Anti-Injunction Act and the tax exception provi-
sion of the Declaratory Judgment Act 3° 4 to dismiss a taxpayer's suit
seeking to "declare the actions of the [Service] to be arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion and unconstitutional, and [to] enjoin the
agency from further action against"30 5 him until the Service complied
with his request to submit his grievances to the National Office for tech-
nical advice, abate the Notice of Deficiency, and hold an appeals confer-
ence. The taxpayer also sought a declaration that the Service violated
his constitutional rights by keeping records classifying him as a tax pro-
testor. The court viewed the taxpayer's action as "an attempt to delay
and/or prevent the IRS from assessing and collecting the income tax
deficiencies and penalties due because of [taxpayer's] failure to file in-
come tax returns for the years in question.
°3 0 6
In United States v. Parsons,30 7 an individual30 8 filed false Form 1099's
with the Service, reflecting that he had paid taxable compensation to
various public and private officials with whom he had disagreements, in
an attempt to trigger tax audits or investigations of those individuals. 30 9
States, 573 F. Supp. 982, 984 (N.D. Ind. 1983), in response to what the organization "per-
ceives to be an unconstitutional and oppressive monetary and taxation system. The lead-
ership of the NCBA advocates and promotes opposition to federal income tax laws."
United States v. Stelten, 867 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1989). Among other services, the
National Commodity Exchange, which has been described as the "service wing" of the
NCBA, is "operated by NCBA members as a private or warehouse bank" which the Service
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occurred, and alternatively, that qualified immunity protected the government agents.
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302. Parallel litigation was pursued by the NCBA. See National Commodity & Barter
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TA XA TION
The Tenth Circuit affirmed Parson's conviction on thirteen counts of
willfully making a false statement to a United States agency3 1 ° and one
count of knowingly making and presenting a false claim.
3 1 '
In United States v. Cutler,3 1 2 the taxpayer opened various stock bro-
kerage accounts and undertook substantial trading activity using false
names, phone numbers, and social security numbers. Based on the false
account information, the brokerage firm prepared and filed Forms 1099-
B reflecting the stock transaction information. The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed Cutler's felony conviction that was based on six counts of aiding
and assisting in the preparation or presentation of false documents aris-
ing under the internal revenue laws. 3 13 In United States v. Payne,3 1 4
under facts similar to those present in Cutler, the taxpayer's conviction
for tax evasion3 1 5 and false representation of social security numbers
3 1 6
was upheld.
In Van Skiver v. United States,3s 7 a tax protester3 1 8 brought an action
alleging wrongful levy and unauthorized disclosure of tax return infor-
mation, and seeking to quiet title to personal property. After the district
court dismissed the action, the Van Skivers filed a self-styled "Motion to
Reconsider." Finding no support in the Federal Rules of Evidence to
authorize such a motion, and finding various other defects in the motion
and the taxpayers' claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
action.
on a minor traffic matter, New Mexico resident filed false 1099's reflecting she had paid
over $400,000 in taxable compensation to the municipal judge who presided at her trial
and to various jail and police personnel; conviction affirmed); United States v.
Hildebrandt, 961 F.2d 116 (8th Cir. 1992) (farmer filed false Form 1099's on various indi-
viduals that were connected with the bank seizure of his farm; conviction affirmed); United
States v. Citrowske, 951 F.2d 899 (8th Cir. 1991) (farmer filed false Form 1099's on 36
individuals; conviction affirmed).
310. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
311. See id. § 287.
312. 948 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1991).
313. I.R.C. § 7206(2) (1988) makes it a felony to willfully aid or assist in, or procure,
counsel, or advise "the preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any mat-
ter arising under, the internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim, or other docu-
ment, which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter."
314. 978 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1992).
315. See I.R.C. § 7201 (1988).
316. See 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) (1991 Supp.).
317. 952 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1991).
318. Raymond and Alma Van Skiver are no strangers to the federal courts. For an
example of the bizarre tenor of the Van Skivers' views on the internal revenue laws, see
United States v. Van Skiver, 1991-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,017 (D. Kan. 1990).
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